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Summary 
Vulnerability to scarcity or to reduction of natural capital depends on defensive 
substitution possibilities that, in turn, are affected by the availability of other productive 
factors. However, in several developing countries asset distribution tends to be highly 
skewed. Taking into ac- count these elements, this paper argues that environmental 
degradation may represent a push factor of economic development in an economy 
polarized into two main classes (the Rich and the Poor) and characterized by the 
following stylized facts: a) the main income source of the rural poor is self-employment 
in traditional activities highly depending on natural resources; b) labor remuneration in 
rural sector represents the basic opportunity cost for (unskilled) labor in the economy. 
Thus, given that environmental degradation reduces labor productivity of the rural poor, 
it may depress wages; c) production of the modern sector managed by the rich is less 
affected by depletion of natural resources because they can adopt defensive strategies 
that the poor cannot. They are able to defend themselves by partially substituting natural 
resources with physical capital accumulation and wage labor employment. We will 
show that, in this context, environmental depletion may benefit the modern sector 
through an increase in low cost labor supply and, in turn, it may stimulate economic 
transition. However the structural change is likely to result in an increase in inequality. 
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1 Introduction
In the economic literature the environment has been studied from opposing per-
spectives and as a bivalent concept. It has been seen as a “source” of value and
wealth: water, land and the other natural resources are the basis of our sub-
sistence and, at the same time, they are assets that can be used in economic
activities for generating income or self-consumed goods. On the other hand,
the environment has been viewed as a limit to economic growth and, therefore,
to the expansion of well-being: economic activities based on natural resources
exploitation are subject to the bounds of their productive inputs. Land is con-
sidered a fixed and non reproducible asset; non renewable resources are prone
to exhaustion, while reproduction of renewable resources cannot surpass their
carrying capacity 1.
From the perspective of those authors who have pointed out the limited
reproducible capacity of the natural resources, structural change, namely a re-
duction of the traditional primary sector’s employment and output share, has
been considered a key element in overcoming nature’s constraint leading to an
expansion of productive possibilities. As observed by Lo´pez (2007) there is a
quite strong consensus on the role of structural change as a cause and conse-
quence of economic development and growth (Lewis 1955, Ranis and Fei 1962,
Lucas 2004): primary traditional activities in the rural sector have been seen
as limited by the fixity of some productive factors, while expansion of the non-
resource sectors may permit an unending process of labor productivity growth
because they rely on assets (human and physical capital) that can expand over
time. Also Lucas (2004) recently stated that “the origins of modern economic
world can be seen, in part, as a transition from a traditional agricultural society
to a society of sustained growth in opportunities of human and physical capital
accumulation”. A part of the literature of “resource curse” can be included
in this viewpoint too (see e.g. Matsuyama 1992, Sachs and Warner 1997, Auty
2001): a large endowment of natural resources is likely to delay diversification
of economic structure towards more dynamic sectors resulting in low economic
growth rates. Finally, such perspective is consistent with many studies find-
ing that access to non-agricultural activities can represent a poverty alleviation
1A part of literature focusing on rich countries and on pollution (see e.g. Aghion and
Howitt 1998, Antoci and Bartolini 2004, Stockey 1998) considers the environment as a luxury
or final good which affects the utility function of people. This idea is neglected in this article
because we consider that, in developing countries, the environment and natural resources,
especially in rural areas, are, first of all, an input of production.
2
strategy2: rural households that get off-farm jobs can experience a rise in their
labor productivity and earnings. It follows that governments should introduce
policies helping to diversify the income of households that rely on subsistence
primary activities. Looking at the environment as wealth and source of sub-
sistence, environment preservation and access to natural resources has been
regarded as a crucial requirement for livelihood defence of rural poor popula-
tions. Given that the poor tend to be highly dependent on natural resources
and vulnerable to environmental degradation, availability and quality of natural
resources can be considered fundamental factors in the struggle against poverty.
Indeed, it is commonly recognized that no long-term strategy of poverty alle-
viation can succeed in the face of forces that promote the persistent erosion of
the resources upon which poor people depend (Leonard 1989, UNDP 2005). At
the same time, dependence on resource-based activities can be seen as a limit:
given that the rural poor largely rely on natural capital for their subsistence,
they are also prone to entering a vicious circle of further impoverishment and
environmental degradation. From this conceptual framework it follows that the
measures and changes that provide incentives for investments in modern sectors
or that help labor shift to modern sectors have been seen as policies that can
stimulate economic growth and from a certain point also reduce poverty. More-
over, economic transition is likely to result in a reduction in pressures of the poor
on natural resources with a positive effect on natural ecosystem preservation.
Therefore, countries that manage to trigger off a structural change take a path
towards sustainable development. Indeed several developing countries, despite
their attempts to introduce such interventions, have witnessed a persistence of
poverty, especially in rural areas, environmental degradation, an increase in the
income inequality associated with different economic performances. Obviously,
such results stem from various economic, social and institutional factors; thus,
this work will not attempt to provide an extensive and critical assessment of
the various explanations found in the literature. The purpose, indeed, is to con-
tribute to the analysis of the role that the environment may play in the relation-
ship between growth, poverty and distribution in the light of some peculiarities
of several developing countries. Understanding the conditions and factors re-
lated to the environmental dynamics that influence distributional, poverty and
economic outcomes may give us a clue about how to maximize benefits from the
2On the role of off-farm (rural or urban) labor in raising household income, see: Weiming
et al. (2004) for China, Escobal (2002) for Peru, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) for Mexico
and Central America, Reardon et al. (1998) for Latin America.
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environment or, conversely, minimize its limits in the struggle against poverty.
Thus, the work attempts to provide a conceptual and joint framework able to
embody both opposing conceptions of the environment. Alternative develop-
ment paths are distinguished according to the ability of economic systems to
preserve the value of the environment as wealth and subsistence basis and to
overcome the limits of natural resource dependence. The impact on poverty,
distribution, output level and composition is also discussed. Finally, attempts
are made to identify the conditions and factors that might determine the type
of development path undertaken by a region or by a country. This analysis
permits identifying unexpected scenarios different from the positive structural
change predicted by the mainstream view. In particular, the work investigates
conditions under which there is a theoretical possibility that an expansion of
the capitalistic sector can be associated with a process of impoverishment and
depletion of natural resources.
2 Well-being, growth and environmental dy-
namics with heterogenous agents
2.1 Setting of the problem
Most developing countries and advanced economies during their first phases
of development present a dual structure with a coexistence of a “traditional”
sector and a “modern” sector. The first one is often characterized by the use
of labor intensive techniques, employment of family labor and low ability of
capital accumulation. A large part of this sector comprises subsistence agricul-
ture, small scale fishery, timber and breeding activities (from now on referred
as traditional or subsistence primary activities). Therefore people employed in
this sector largely depend on the land on which they live for their livelihood
(IFAD 2001a). Besides, as pointed out by Ebkom and Bojo (1999), small-scale
farmers often derive additional sources of income from the environment (wild
fruits, nuts, berries, herbs, medicinal plants, bushmeat and roots), pastoralists
derive essential nutrients from wild flora and fauna in marginal areas and small
fishermen rely on marine resources for their subsistence. That is, subsistence
primary activities are highly dependent on environmental goods and services:
because of a low endowment of physical (and human) capital, the main factors of
production are given by self-employed labor and natural resources. At the same
4
time, households employed in this sector are also among the categories to which
segments of poor population usually belong3. In addition to this group, another
part of the traditional sector is represented by subsistence off-farm activities.
People working in this sector are self-employed workers (in non-primary produc-
tion) who own and operate one-person business and work alone (for example,
those who work at home and domestic workers) or with the help of unpaid
workers, generally family members and apprentices. Subsistence off-farm activ-
ities are less dependent on natural resources (even if some of these activities are
linked to agriculture), but are still characterized by labor intensive techniques,
low ability of capital accumulation as well as low labor earnings. Therefore the
majority of its workforce belongs to the lowest income quintiles. The “modern”
sector usually refers to activities with a higher labor productivity, more capital
intensive production and employment of wage labor. It includes commercial
agriculture, production of exportation commodities, industrial and formal ser-
vice sector. These firms and economic activities are usually managed or owned
by well-off households which are more able to accumulate financial and physical
capital. The dependence of this sector on environmental resources varies a lot
among countries and it is generally higher in economies with abundance of nat-
ural resources. In those countries (almost all developing countries) that have
not undertaken a complete transition to industrialization, another urban infor-
mal sector has emerged too, increased by a continuous process of urbanization.
In advanced economies, the industrial sector has been able to absorb the labor
from the traditional agricultural activities, while in many developing countries
this sector has not been enough dynamic. Thus, a non-agricultural informal
sector has developed and it comprises, not only off-farm subsistence activities
already described and ascribed to the traditional sector, but also the universe of
micro enterprises which employ a few paid dependent employees (unregistered
transportation services, small stores, small firms belonging to construction, tex-
tile sector etc). In general, capital intensity and labor productivity are lower
than in the modern sector. This factor, associated with the non-adherence to
government and labor regulations, leads to low and flexible wages. In the same
way, the owner-employers in this sector are usually less rich than the households
that hold or manage enterprises of the modern sector, but at the same time,
given their higher capital endowment, they are better-off than people working
3According to IFAD’s Rural Poverty Report, the rural poor in various regions are usually
rainfed farmers, smallholder farmers, pastoralists, artisanal fishermen, wage laborers, indige-
nous people, female headed households, and displaced people (IFAD 2001a).
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in the traditional sectors. Three main observations can be drawn from this
schematic description of the production systems that characterize many devel-
oping countries:
1) The traditional activities, the sector of informal small firms and the mod-
ern sector differ for adopted technology and consequently for productivity,
dependence on natural resources, vulnerability to environmental degrada-
tion as well as their output growth which is not equally subject to external
constraints. That is, output composition and sectorial labor allocation are
key elements in explicating economic performance of an economy.
2) The sectorial composition of an economic system is strictly linked to in-
come and asset distribution and, at the same time, changes in the sectorial
composition of employment and output are likely to cause effects on dis-
tribution and poverty.
3) Consequences on economic growth and on distribution produced by a
structural change or by an unbalanced growth path (i.e. an expansion
of one sector more than proportional to other sectors’ growth) are likely
to depend not only on the characteristics of each sector, but also on the
linkages among the different sectors.
It follows that any work aiming at studying the relationship between poverty,
environment and growth in developing countries cannot avoid referring to the
theory of structural change, to pluri-sectorial models4 and to the literature that
4The first term of reference for the formulation of a model aiming to describe the rela-
tionships among poverty, environment and growth should be the theoretical literature which
studies possibility and feasibility of a continuous growth that is also environmentally compati-
ble. Even if it is recognized that sustainability sets a limit to economic growth rates in steady
state, namely the economy grows at a slower pace than it would do in absence of environ-
mental problems, authors have identified several conditions for insuring a positive sustainable
economic growth. According to Stockey’s approach (1998), for example, in economies with ex-
ogenous technical progress, sustained growth in capital and continuing tightening of pollution
are compatible with a constant rate of return of capital. In other models sustainable growth is
obtained also without assuming exogenous positive externalities. In Aghion and Howitt (1998)
environmental sustainability is reached through an increase in ratio between human (clean)
and physical (dirty) capital in the input composition (Aghion and Howitt 1998); Bevenberg
and Smulder (1996) propose a model in which an endogenous progress reduces the intensity of
pollution produced by the economic system in a economy where the planner subsides R & D
research in abatement technologies. However Lo´pez and Toman (2005) note that these models
need conditions for sustainable development that are quite demanding and are rarely satis-
fied, especially in developing countries. For example the assumption of a benign social planner
able to internalize all environmental effects and to apply an optimal environmental policy or
a marginal utility of consumption greater than one (as in Stockey’s and Aghion and Howitt’s
models) are quite unrealistic in contexts where environmental institutions and systems of
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studies the links between different sectors. That is the purpose of the next para-
graph that reviews the literature on take-off and structural change and discusses
the main contributions considering structural or frequent characteristics of de-
veloping countries such as environmental externalities, significant dependence of
production on natural resources, ill defined property rights and asset inequality.
Indications for the formulation of a new model are assessed and proposed.
2.2 Structural change, environment and poverty: a review
of the literature
The literature on development theory has identified various factors and mech-
anisms which may explain a structural change, namely the movement of labor
force from the traditional sector to the modern one. The role of structural
change in boosting economic take off has been analyzed too. Today, all ad-
vanced economies and the most successful emerging economies (mainly from
East Asia region) have experienced a complete transition and migration out
of traditional agriculture: this sector has almost disappeared and, as noted by
Lucas (2004), the agricultural activities that have remained is a part of the
modern economy with a sustained productivity growth, while labor share of
agriculture has fallen to vary low levels. The development theory has tried to
explain this stylized fact (namely economic growth and poverty reduction asso-
ciated with a structural change) by referring to neo-classical and Keynesian and
post-Keynesian models according to which accumulation of physical capital is
the key factor for economic growth. Saving and investment in physical capital
cause an increase in labor productivity leading to economic expansion. In a dual
framework, such vision implies that the capital intensive sector is able to sustain
a process of economic growth, while the production of the subsistence sector is
constrained and cannot overcome a certain threshold because it relies on limited
factors of production such as land and labor. Therefore a labor shift towards the
“modern” sector leads to a structural change associated with economic growth.
controls are weak and where a large share of populations enjoy low level of consumption as
in many developing countries. Moreover most of models consider the environment as a final
good and are quite aggregative in the sense that are based on a unique representative agent
or on a unique productive sector. On the contrary in several developing countries asset and
income distribution is highly concentrated and therefore agents differ for initial conditions,
available strategies and vulnerability, and economic and environmental dynamics are likely
to produce effects that are not homogenously distributed. Moreover, in developing countries,
natural resources are not only a consumption good, but, and above all, an important factor of
production. For all these reasons a large part of the modern sustainable growth theory seems
not appropriate for developing countries.
7
From a certain point, labor remuneration tends to be linked to labor productiv-
ity; therefore such transition allows an increase in wages with positive effect on
poverty alleviation. In the modern theory, this conceptual framework has been
deepened by defining capital in a broader sense to include also accumulation of
human capital and public goods as factors for continuous potential for growth
(Barro 1990, Lucas 1988 and 2004, Romer 1986). The development doctrine,
however, does not agree on mechanisms that are able to trigger off a successful
structural change. Some main visions can be identified:
1) Some development theorists attribute to agriculture growth and to agri-
cultural productivity the role of leading the process of industrialization.
Kalecky (1971), for example, observes that agriculture provides wage goods
therefore growth of agricultural production is essential for limiting wage
growth and facilitating industrialization processes. Other authors (Singer
1979, Adelman 1984, De Janvry 1984, Vogel 1994) underscore the po-
tential of agriculture to generate domestic demand to stimulate indus-
trialization. Adelman introduces the idea of “agricultural-demand-led-
industrialization” strategy: growth in agriculture sector might stimulate
demand of manufacturing goods, via rural income increase, and might
expand food supply without rising prices. In the same way, Vogel (1994)
identifies agriculture as “leading” sector given its strong backward linkages
in developing countries. In short, according to this view, the increase in
agricultural output benefits the industrialization process and the growth
of the modern sector: a higher agricultural production permits feeding a
growing urban population and raises income of rural population stimulat-
ing domestic demand for industrial (final and intermediate) goods. Given
that agriculture and labor-intensive traditional activities almost coincide
during the first phases of the development path, this vision underlines that
the traditional sector has to be sustained in order to prompt a virtuous
transition.
2) Other theories (Rosenstein - Roden 1943, Rostow 1960, Lewis 1954, Jor-
genson 1961, Ranis and Fei 1961, Hirschman 1958) highlight the role of
the modern sector as engine of economic growth and stress the need to ex-
pand the industrial activities. Presence of previous capital accumulation5,
5Availability of resource that can be invested in capital accumulation can derive from differ-
ent factors: Adelman and Morris (1988) observe that, in Canada, Australia, New Zeeland and
Scandinavian countries, expansion of commodity exportation helped industrialization, Shin
8
technical progress, international investments and credits, policy interven-
tions that provide support or incentives for investment in the industrial
sector, for saving or for human capital formation are seen as factors that
can generate a process of structural change. Modern activities constitute
the leading sector, even if a stable or growing agricultural production is
acknowledged as a necessary condition for successful structural change6.
Under this perspective, the change in labor allocation is the result of pull
forces driving the workforce from low productive (subsistence) activities
to the capitalistic sector7. On the other hand, the role of agriculture in
transforming developing economies is seen as subordinate to acceleration
of industrial activities, while the subsistence sector is regarded as a source
of labor supply and it is expected to provide abundant “cheap” labor able
to feed a successful take off.
3) Other authors make a further step considering that the availability of a
reserve of cheap labor provided by traditional sectors has a crucial role
in boosting industrialization. Following this approach, also push factors
prompting labor expulsion from low productive activities are important
determinants of structural changes, while any force that keeps labor force
in agriculture sector or slows down labor shift may be an obstacle to in-
dustrialization and, consequently, to growth. According to some authors,
the experience of industrialized countries might reflect this mechanism.
As already noted by Karl Marx, Humpries (1990), for example, highlights
that in England parliamentary enclosures of the eighteenth century con-
tributed to proletarianization process of rural population. The exclusion
from common land access reduced considerably non wage source of sub-
sistence available to rural classes and left them more dependent on wages.
This, in turn, helped the process of industrialization. In the same way,
looking at the industrialization experience of some resource-poor countries
(such as Belgium, Switzerland, Asian Tigers), Matsuyama (1992) finds a
(1998) underlines that compensation of landlords during the agrarian reform in South Korea
was functional to the transfer of capitals, that were inefficiently immobilized in agriculture,
towards productive industrial activities.
6According to Rostow (1960), for example, the revolutionary changes in agricultural pro-
ductivity are an essential condition for successful take-off. In the same way, Lewis (1954)
writes if the capitalistic sector produces no food, its expansion increases the demand for food,
raises the price of food in terms of capitalistic products and so reduces profits. This is one of
the ways in which industrialisation is dependent upon agricultural improvement.
7Ranis and Fei (1961), for example state that “development consists of the re-allocation of
surplus workers, whose contribution to output may have been zero or negligible, to industry”.
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negative link between labor productivity in the agricultural sector and
manufacturing growth. According to the author, a scarce endowment of
natural resources implies a low productivity in the rural sector. In this
context, the industrial sector can benefit from a large supply of labor at
low cost and the economy gains a comparative advantage in manufacturing
production. That is, poor resources countries may successfully industri-
alize by importing primary products and exporting manufacturing goods
(Matsuyama, 1992)8.
All these contributions attempt to identify the main determinants or obsta-
cles of structural changes considered as a cause and consequence of the eco-
nomic growth process, the first and necessary step towards poverty alleviation
too. A different perspective has been recently adopted by Lo´pez (2003, 2007)
who proposes a distinction between two types of economic transition: benign
and perverse structural change. The first one is associated with an increase in
investment in modern sector that raises labor productivity in this sector leading
to an increase of rural urban migration driven by pull forces. The result is an
alleviation of environmental pressures, an increase in share of labor and output
of modern sectors, economic growth and, from a certain point, a rise in labor
earnings. This is the structural change experienced by industrialized countries
and by the most successful emerging economies and it is the typical transition
described and explicated by earlier theorists. However, Lo´pez (2003) observes
that in many middle-low income countries9 the “development” path over the
last decades has been characterized by an impressive process of urbanization,
growing problems of environmental degradation and low performances in eco-
nomic growth and in the struggle against poverty. Therefore he detects another
type of structural change: a perverse structural change associated with a labor
shift from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors driven by push forces. In this
case, a decline in productivity of agricultural traditional activities leads to a re-
duction of labor opportunity cost. The result is labor migration, an increase in
non-agricultural share and, in particular, expansion of informal urban activities
(instead of economic activities of the modern sector) with declining or stagnant
wages and less positive economic trends.
8However, it has to be noted that economic openness and the possibility to substitute do-
mestic agricultural products with those imported are the necessary conditions for the existence
of this linkage.
9In particular he refers to Latin America, but the observation is valid for many other
countries too.
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The main causes that Lo´pez identifies as responsible for the failure to prompt
a benign structural change and for the emergence of perverse structural changes
are inadequate policies aiming at fostering productivity in the modern sector in
addition to a complete neglect of traditional subsistence sector of the rural poor.
The author blames policies that have focused only on physical capital accumu-
lation neglecting the complementary role of other assets, such as public goods
(that, to a certain measure, comprise also natural capital) and human capital,
that are affected by higher market failures than capital market. Massive pub-
lic subsidies for physical capital investment have exacerbated underinvestment
in public goods (included environmental protection) and in human capital and
have favored natural resource-demanding activities, while most benefits have
been captured by the rich, the main owners of physical and financial capital.
The results have been environmental destruction and increasing inequality. Fi-
nally, to the extent that natural, public and human capital assets constitute
factors of production, a physical capital-biased public policy has negatively af-
fect economic performance too.
2.3 Structural change, environment and poverty: a con-
ceptual framework for developing countries
Economic, social and environmental conditions both at national and interna-
tional levels have changed since the period in which the bulk of the above dis-
cussed literature developed and today developing countries are experiencing a
process of transition in an economic and social context that profoundly differs
from that faced by most industrialized countries during their early phases of
development. Therefore it is worth assessing the literature on structural change
in the light of the different setting.
2.3.1 Trade openness and heterogeneity of the agriculture sector
The majority of developing countries are little open economies. In the last two
decades, several countries have undertaken trade liberalization reforms and,
consequently, the importance of the domestic demand in sustaining economic
growth has diminished (at least for trade sectors) because economies are less
constrained by a limited national demand. On the contrary, in open economies,
a fundamental factor for economic growth is productive competitiveness that
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depends, among other important factors, on labor cost10. Moreover in many
countries, especially in middle income economies of Latin America and Asia,
the agriculture sector is not homogeneous and the coincidence between the agri-
culture and traditional sector no longer works: despite the increasing process
of agroindustrialization (Pingali 2001), as already noted, commercial and sub-
sistence activities still coexist. Commercial agriculture is usually practised by
medium- and large-size farmers that employ wage labor and use capital inten-
sive and modern technologies. This sector is usually market-oriented and its
production is sent to urban national or foreign markets. On the contrary, sub-
sistence agriculture is managed by rural households that adopt poor farming
techniques, employ household and, in part, seasonal labor, while the production
is used mainly for self-consumption.
In this context the role of the traditional sector for poverty alleviation and
economic growth is less likely to operate through the channel of food prices both
because the traditional sector cannot be seen as the main supplier of foods and
because, as noted by Lo´pez (2002), in middle income countries characterized
by a highly open trade regime and good transportation infrastructures, food
prices are mainly determined by foreign market conditions rather than by do-
mestic conditions11. Also “backward” and “forward” linkages of agriculture into
the input provider sectors, food processing and service sectors are more related
to commercial and modern agriculture than to the traditional subsistence sec-
tor. For the sake of simplicity, the model we propose does not embody all the
relationships between poverty, employment, output sectoral composition, and
growth that have been identified in literature. Thus, the model neglects the dy-
namics which are likely to be less relevant in today developing countries, such
as food (as wage good) price channel and effects produced by backward/forward
linkage of subsistence sector12. However, the introduction of these mechanisms
10In this sense, Matsuyama’s model (2002) is particularly explicative because it shows how
the growth process might be driven by different factors in a open and a closed context: he
finds a negative relationship between agricultural productivity and economic growth in open
economies, while he detects the inverse links in closed economies.
11By using data referring to 1970-2001, Soloaga and Torres (2003), for example, find that
in Mexico agricultural growth does not have a significant impact on real food prices, being
the real exchange rate movements the main determinant. Lo´pez and Anriquez (2007) find
that in Chile agriculture growth is negatively correlated with real price of non-tradable foods
but food price reduction explains only between 10 to 15 % of impact produced by agriculture
growth on poverty alleviation.
12This is consistent with Vogel’s findings (1994) of increasing backward linkages as average
income grows. He notes that during the development process, agriculture becomes more
capital and input intensive, but it can be added that in middle income countries modern and
commercial agriculture is more developed than in low income economies where the traditional
12
and links represents an interesting extension of the model that may deserve
further research.
2.3.2 Traditional sector and opportunity cost of labor
The theories that regard labor surplus as a determinant of structural changes
are based on the assumption that wages in the urban sectors are driven by
labor supply coming from the traditional sector. Thus, an abundant “cheap”
labor supply allows to control growth of urban wages and to foster industrial
development. Actually these models seem to be more appropriate to explain the
evolution of industrialized economies than that of developing countries where
urban sector is segmented and the gap between formal and informal wages is a
structural feature because the modern sector is not able to absorb all labor sup-
ply. At the same time, Lo´pez (2003) observes that in developing countries labor
remuneration in primary sector (especially traditional primary activities that
use labor intensive techniques) is still likely to represent the basic opportunity
cost or floor wage for unskilled labor in the whole economy. In fact, the primary
sector still absorbs a large share of labor, especially unskilled labor: in 2002,
for example, employment in agriculture as percentage of total employment was
3.85 % in high income countries, 14.33 % in upper middle income countries, but
it rose to 39.83 % in lower middle income countries (World Development Indi-
cators 2006) and in low income countries is even higher. Therefore this sector
can be a key factor in setting the wage rate of unskilled workers and, correcting
for skill differentials, of the whole economy13.
In conclusion, if in developing countries labor remuneration in traditional
agriculture is not always directly associated with economic growth, it is likely
to be linked to wages in the other sectors and, through this channel, to poverty.
In the construction of the model and in the discussions of its results these
agriculture is more widespread. Therefore such linkages can be attributed more to the modern
than to traditional agriculture.
13For example, Lo´pez and Anriquez (2006) show that in Chile (1987-2003 period) the main
channel through which agriculture growth reduces poverty is the labor market: expansion of
agriculture production raises wages and employment of unskilled workers among whom poverty
is more predominant, while effects on poverty through food price channel is less relevant. In
a study on sectoral composition of growth and poverty in India, Datt and Ravallion (1996)
find that output growth in agriculture reduced poverty in both urban and rural areas, while
in a successive work (Datt and Ravallion 1998) their analyzes show that growth in farm
productivity contributes to poverty alleviation both directly and by inducing a rise in the
wage rate as well as a reduction in food prices (although the price effect is lower). Therefore,
also in India, poverty reduction impact of agricultural growth might be partially explained by
its positive effect on wages of unskilled workers.
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observations will be taken into account and labor remuneration in subsistence
rural sector will represent the basic opportunity cost for labor in the economy.
2.3.3 Environmental dynamics and heterogeneity of agents
The bulk of literature on structural changes and on links among economic sec-
tors neglects environmental dynamics. As seen above, in general, environmental
externalities do not enter theoretical models and when natural resources are in-
cluded in the analysis they are considered as given and their role is assessed
in relation to their abundance/scarcity or to their limited and fixed amount.
On the contrary, environmental resources are not fixed, are subject to poor
management and over-exploitation (Lo´pez 2007). Environmental externalities
can affect economic activities especially in developing countries where property
rights tend to be ill-defined and ill-protected, environmental institutions and
regulations are weak and, as noted by Lo´pez (1997) and by Sachs et al. (2001),
natural resources are more fragile than in developed countries that are usually
located in temperate areas (on the contrary, most of developing countries are
located in tropical and sub-tropical regions).
In order to address this knowledge gap, we refer to works addressing the study
of conditions for sustainable economic growth by using two-sector models that
include environmental dynamics and consider environmental resources as pro-
ductive inputs such in Lo´pez et al. (2005) and Eliasson and Turnovsky (2004).
The approach of this work follows these contributions but with some impor-
tant differences: we are attempting to consider not only sector composition of
the economy and factors susceptible to trigger off a structural change but also
the distributional dimension. The model intends to distinguish different sectors
and agents in terms of their interactions with natural capital to shed light on
distributional impact of environmental degradation. In short, the objective is
to investigate how the effects of environmental dynamics change in relation to
asset endowments and definition of production functions.
Distribution matters: some empirical evidence In many developing
countries asset distribution is highly concentrated. Differences in asset en-
dowment and composition determine differences in terms of constraints and
opportunities in the choices of income generating strategies. Thus, as seen in
the introduction, production function and sectorial structure in the economic
systems partially reflects asset and income distribution. At the same time, vul-
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nerability to environmental degradation is linked to the degree of dependency
on natural resources (i.e. on production function) and on ability to adopt de-
fensive strategies, namely the ability to substitute environmental resources with
other productive assets. That is, in the societies where there is a polarization
in the asset distribution, agents differ not only for their income, but also for
their vulnerability to environmental depletion. Thus, the poor, especially in ru-
ral areas, tend to be more dependent on natural resources and more vulnerable
to ecosystem degradation. Three quarters of the poor live in rural areas and
more than half of the rural poor depend on breeding and agricultural activities:
cultivation of staple food is the main source of calories, income and job for the
rural poor (IFAD 2001). Moreover, it is commonly recognized that rural poor in
developing countries significantly rely on common pool resources of the commu-
nity where they live (Dasgupta 1993, 2001), two-thirds of the world’s population
live within 100 kms of the coast and they may depend on marine resources for
subsistence (Ballance 2004), while according to estimates made by UNDP et al.
(2005), around 1 billion of the world’s poor rely in some way on forests (indige-
nous people wholly dependent on forests, smallholder farmers who grow farm
trees or manage remnant forests for subsistence and income). Natural assets and
common or free access resources provide the poor with other additional services:
regulating services for production such as mitigation of floods, drought and ero-
sion, renewal of soil, soil fertility or provision of food, fuelwood and energy,
fresh water and genetic material (UNEP 2004). Microeconomic studies confirm
the relevance of dependence of rural population on community or free access re-
sources (Jodha 1986, Cavendish 2000, Falconer 1990, Back and Nesmith 200114,
Fisher 2004, Hecht et al. 1988 cited in Friedman and Rangan 1993, Narain et al.
2005), while the meta-analysis carried out by Vedeld15 et al. (2004) on a sample
of 54 studies finds that average environmental income amounts to 22 percent
of total household income, where environmental income is defined as “rent (or
valued added) capture through consumption, barter, or sale of natural capital
within the first link in a market chain, starting from the point at which the nat-
ural capital is extracted or appropriated”. Finally, in absence of an insurance
market, access to environmental resources may represent a survival strategy to
14They estimate that about 12 percent of household income to poor households in India
is provided by common pool resource collection. Similar results are found by Nairain et al.
(2005) in Jhabua, one of the poorest districts of India.
15Vedeld. P., A. Angelsen, E. Sjaastad and G. Kobugabe-Berg (2004), “Counting on the
Environment: Forest Incomes and the Rural Poor”. Environment Department Paper N. 98,
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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cope with adverse shocks16. In addition, the poor do not have appropriate tools
and means for coping with environmental depletion. Therefore they are more
vulnerable than the rich to pollution and to degradation of natural capital while
lack well defined property rights, of power, human capital and political linkages
make the poor more prone to be deprived of their access on natural resources
to advantage of powerful agents (State, large firms or influent people). On the
other hand, the rich have a higher ability to substitute private goods for public
ones. Thus, they are able to self-protect themselves from pollution and to face
depletion of natural capital (UNEP 2004). Besides, the rich may have the power
to access to natural resources at a lower cost because of their power and lack
of well defined and enforceable property rights. In the light of these elements,
the model will consider different production functions for the rich and the poor,
while a different grade of resource dependence will be contemplated.
Environmental externalities of economic activities Our model considers
a small open economy with two sectors: a traditional resource-based sector
that rely on self-employment of poor households and a sector managed by the
rich. Unlike Lo´pez’s and Eliasson and Turnovsky’s approaches that distinguish
between a clean and a dirty sector, the model proposed in this article follows
a sector classification based on asset endowment of the two groups (that is
reflected in the production function) and contemplates the possibility that both
sectors cause an environmental impact. Thus, in this characterization we follow
Antoci and Borghesi’s (2002) approach17 which investigates the interactions
between two sectors (North and South) by hypothesizing that both harm natural
resources. They study a model in which negative externalities may constitute an
engine of economic growth through the following mechanism: economic growth
produces negative externalities that reduce environmental goods (that is a final
16For example, Takasaki et al. (2004) have found that among river peasant households in a
region of Peru (Pacaya-Samiria National Reserve) gathering of non timber forest products and
fishing are the major strategies to cope with floods, while their subsistence depends mainly
on shifting cultivation, foodplain agriculture, hunting, fishing and non timber forest products
gathering. In the same way, Dei’s study (1992) on natural resources role during recession
and drought in 1982 and 1983 in southeastern Ghana showed that the poorest households
depended on the “bush” for 20 percent of their food intake, compared to the highest income
share, for which the bush provided only 2 percent of the household food intake. Women and
children in particular relied on wild products such as roots, fibers, leaves, bark, fruit, seeds,
nuts, insects, and sap. Men also hunted and trapped small mammals, reptiles, and birds.
17This idea was introduced by Antoci (1996) and Antoci and Bartolini (1997, 1999) and
further developed in following works by Antoci (2005), Antoci and Borghesi (2002), Antoci,
Galeotti and Russu (2005), Bartolini and Bonatti (2002, 2003). These studies focus on sub-
stitution of free goods freely provided by natural or social environment with private costly
goods.
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good). Agents try to defend themselves from well-being losses by increasing their
labor supply in order to raise their consumption of man-made goods. This leads
to a growth of output and of negative externalities. Thus, defensive strategies
generate a self-enforcing economic growth process but the growth path is likely
to be undesirable, that is Pareto dominated in terms of well-being18. Our model
differs in that we consider natural assets as factors of production, while in Antoci
and Borghesi’s model environment enters utility function as consumption good.
That is in our context a self-reinforcing process of undesirable economic growth
might emerge but only under some restrictions because degradation of natural
resources can negatively affect production.
Environmental impact of the poor A broad cross-section of the literature
considers the poverty as a cause, direct or indirect, of environmental degrada-
tion. It is argued that poverty is associated with high discount rates19: given
that the poor are concerned with day-to-day survival, they are likely to adopt
short-term coping strategies and to under-invest in sustainable practices with a
long term return (WCED 1987, Durning 1989, World Bank 1992, UNEP 1995).
In addition, they might also lack access to productive resources, institutional
and credit services, off-farm labor opportunities, technology or knowledge in or-
der to invest in environmental protection and to reduce the pressure on natural
resources, even if they are conscious of decrease in the natural resource basis
of their livelihood (IFAD 2001b, Pascual and Barbier 2001)20. Demographic
pressure and the commonly recognized link between poverty and population
growth can further worsen environmental depletion (Brown et al. 1998). Fi-
nally, given that a large part of rural poor live in fragile areas, they are also more
18The idea that there is no coincidence between production and welfare maximization is
not new in literature. Indeed, over last years there is a growing debate about the extent
to which economic growth and Gross National Product can measure social well-being, while
the literature on “genuine saving” points out that the evaluation of the mere man-made
capital accumulation, without imputing change in natural capital, can be a biased indicator
of economic perspectives and welfare path even under weak sustainability assumption. (See,
for example, Vincent 2000, for a review on how national accounts should include environmental
depletion). In particular, it has been argued that, if policy makers want to prevent a decrease
in social utility, they have to avoid fall in net saving that includes not only physical and
human capital, but also natural assets (Hamilton and Clemens 1999, Dasgupta and Maler
2000, Ashem and Weitzam 2001)
19Empirical studies are provided by Poulos and Whittington 2000, Cuesta et al. 1997,
Holden et al. 1996.
20A IFAD’s report is particularly emblematic in this sense. It is argued that “environmental
degradation in rural areas in many developing countries has little to do with modern farming
and intensive agricultural systems. Agriculture practised by poor people often depend on low-
intensity systems in marginal areas. In many parts of the developing world there is vicious
circle of falling farm incomes and resource depletion” (IFAD 2002).
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prone to enter a downward spiral of further impoverishment and environmental
degradation (Picho´n and Uquillas 1997, UNDP 2005, IFAD 2002).
However, even if poverty is recognised as a possible cause of environmen-
tal pressure, in literature there is a consensus that the vision of the poverty
as a major cause of environmental degradation is too simplistic (Durahiappah,
1998) because potential environmental impact of poverty is not univocally de-
termined but it can change in relation to a range of factors. Some authors
argue that poverty does not necessarily imply short time horizons. (Bromley,
1998, Prakash 1997 (cit. in Lipper and Osgood, 2002), Lumley, 1997). Other
observers adhere to the view of the poor as stewards and defenders of environ-
ment. Martinez Alier (2001), for example, has collected several examples and
episodes of people’s protests against the depletion of environmental basis they
depend upon for their livelihood. In the same way the neo-Malthusian theory
of population growth as cause of environmental distress and increasing poverty
is highly debate. Forsyth et al. 1998 note that the poor are often able to adopt
local organizational and land management practises that lessen impacts of pop-
ulation growth and environmental degradation or economic changes. Scheer
(2000) underlines the heterogeneity in environmental management by the rural
poor revealed by the empirical research21. Looking at results of research on
relationship between rural poverty and environmental degradation carried out
in ten different Latin American areas, Swinton et al. (2003) conclude that the
case-studies do not permit detecting significant negative links between poverty
and sustainable management practices. In particular, they highlight the role of
incentives for investment in resource conservation measures and they note that
when proper incentives are lacking, the capacity for responsible natural resource
management (that is lower for the poor than for the rich) becomes irrelevant.
The role of institutional framework in determining the linkages between envi-
ronmental degradation and poverty has been studied also in India’s arid and
semiarid regions by Chopra and Gulati (2003). They found that environmental
degradation caused by increasing demographic pressure tends to force people to
move to urban areas during time of distress, especially during droughts. How-
ever their results show that establishment or resurrection of properly constituted
common property rights may increase the carrying capacity of resources (i.e. the
capacity of environment to support larger populations) reducing migration flows.
21Templeton and Scherr (1999), after a review of over 70 empirical studies in poor hill and
mountain regions, conclude that effects of population growth on land and forest quality is
indeterminate.
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These studies show that the effects of demographic growth on natural resources
exploitation can be mitigated by other factors such as virtuous institutional
dynamics and technological adaptations that may reduce environmental impact
caused by economic activities of the poor and population’s impact on natural
resources. In conclusion, potentiality of the poor producers to cause environ-
mental depletion and degradation can be considered an empirical issue changing
according to the institutional, natural and economic settings and their dynamics.
As noted by a recent UNDP report (2005), experience of interactions between
poverty and environment varies from location to location. Thus, in the model
the sector of the poor causes environmental externalities but no assumptions on
the degree of such impact are made and alternative scenarios are considered.
Environmental impact of the rich and its consequences on the poor
In the model, the sector managed by the rich is represented by capitalistic
activities characterized by the employment of wage labor such as the manufac-
turing, the extractive industries or commercial and mechanized agriculture. It
is assumed that these activities harm natural capital stock with negative ex-
ternalities on the poor. In fact, it is possible to mention many examples of
environmental depletion caused by these activities or by policies focusing on
the promotion of the capitalistic sector. In addition to classical examples of air
and water pollution due to industrial firms and urbanization processes, there
is also an increasing concern on some other consequences of industrialization
and urbanization. For example, from the analysis of deforestation in Brazil,
Guatemala, Cameroon, Malaysia and China, Barraclough and Ghimire (2000)
find that in all cases, most forests were cleared for industrial, infrastructural, and
urban development, with a smaller area cleared for agricultural expansion and,
in particular in Brazil, Malaysia and China, industrialization programs, growing
manufacturing sectors, and rapidly expanding urban populations are identified
as the main causes of deforestation. Therefore, agricultural expansion in those
countries is less about poor peasants clearing land for subsistence production
and more about state-directed industrial development. Other emblematic cases
of environmental externalities caused by the rich are represented by activities of
large-scale commercial enterprises that are often responsible for the unsustain-
able use of natural resources. Moreover, in many cases the negative effect on
natural capital endowments is likely to harm the subsistence basis of the rural
poor. A very clear example of this mechanism is given by the overfishing prob-
lem. The introduction of new fishing technologies has raised labor productivity
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of fishery activities. The modernization of fisheries, the open access nature of
fishery, a growing international demand, and, in certain cases, supply of State
financial subsidies to encourage investments have been factors contributing to
the expansion of capital intensive commercial fishing activities. As a result,
seventy percent of the world’s commercial fisheries are fully exploited or over-
exploited and experience declining yield (World Bank 2003). The impact can
be particularly perverse for artisanal fishermen that can not afford mechanized
boats and, at the same time, face a decline in productivity because of overfish-
ing22. Another example of environmental impact produced by resource-based
commercial firms is given by the deforestation problem. Several researchers ob-
serve and find that, in many low and middle income countries, deforestation,
increased land conversion and soil erosion are associated not only with demo-
graphic growth and land inequalities, but also with the expansion of livestock
numbers, timber extraction - especially in open access areas - and mechanized
agriculture (De Janvry and Garcia 1988, Health and Binswanger 1996, Leonard
1989, Lo´pez 1992, Markandaya 2001, Stonich 1989). All these activities are usu-
ally managed by wealthier households that take advantage of a higher ability to
compete for resource use and access because they are well endowed with cap-
ital and are more politically linked (Barbier 2006)23. These activities produce
not only a direct impact through an intensive exploitation of fragile lands and
unsustainable use of resources, but they are also responsible for perverse and
indirect consequences. People are forced to move into unfamiliar and vulnera-
ble areas in order to allow such activities. Displacement of peasants is likely to
lead to the collapse of traditional institutions inducing farmers to destructive
practices. In the light of these factors, some authors now acknowledge that the
poor are often mere agents of environmental degradation, while the main causes
of natural resource exploitation are consumption and production choices of the
rich (Durahiappah 1998, Leonard 1989, DFID et al. 2002, Ekbom and Bojo
1999). On the contrary, various empirical works illustrate cases in which the
rural poor not only are not responsible for natural resource depletion, but they
also claim interventions against environmental degradation caused, directly or
indirectly, by activities of large firms and rich households and that threaten the
22Kurien (1992), looking at coastal fishery in Kerala, finds that overfishing has dampened
the growth of fishery sector, has increased the disparity between working fishermen and non
worker owners of mechanized boats and has reduced fish available for local consumers. For
other empirical examples see DFID et al. (2002).
23In many cases concessions and input or credit subsidies have benefited more than propor-
tional larger producers.
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natural resource basis on which they live24. Ghai and Vivian (1992) collected
studies on struggles by poor communities to gain control over natural resources
and to face iniquities and environmental degradation caused by capitalists in-
terests often with state support25. Also Friedman and Rangan (1993) review
episodes of “enclosures” that have affected poor populations. In the same way,
Martines-Alier (2002) reports other cases of what he calls “environmentalism of
the poor”. He describes the actions of Oilwatch that is a south-south network
concerned for the loss of biodiversity and forests, soil and water pollution, vio-
lations of human rights and indigenous territorial rights caused by oil and gas
extraction in tropical countries. He also deals with the growing social resistance
against export oriented commercial shrimp farming in several Asian and Latin
American countries (especially in Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Philippines and Malaysia).
In many cases, the expansion of legal or illegal shrimp ponds has caused the
eviction of small fishermen and the destruction of coastal mangrove forests26 to
the detriment of local communities27. Moreover, direct pollution from industrial
shrimp ponds causes loss of fisheries, reduction of potable water and saliniza-
tion of fields. Martines-Alier also describes local resistance against conversion
of natural forests in plantations in Costa Rica and other countries28. Finally
he considers struggles against mining activities responsible for depletion and
contamination of water, air and soil pollution (Martines-Alier, 2002). Another
case of conflict between local poor communities and the capitalistic sector is
represented by the constructions of dams. Even the World Bank (2005), one of
the main supporters of several dam projects, has recognized that the benefits
of dams are mainly enjoyed by the cities and the industries to which they pro-
vide electricity (World Bank 2005), while an independent report of the World
24According to Broad’s study case on Philippines (1994), besides the environmental degrada-
tion as threat for livelihood, other necessary conditions for the poor to become environmental
activists are the existence of a organized civil society and a sense of permanence, namely belief
that their families will likely continue to live in the area affected by depletion.
25The study case investigates the action of grassroots movements against trawler owners
in Kerala, logging contractors and energy companies in Hymalayan region, and agricultural
modernization processes in Mexico.
26It is estimated that over the last two decades one third of the world’s mangroves have
been removed for human activities such as shrimp farming and tourist structures (World Bank
2005).
27Mangroves are a source of income, food and wood for poor people, they defend coast
against water intrusion and cyclones, and they contribute to combating against salinization
and to provide breeding ground for fish.
28Poor people complain because, with the conversion of forest in plantations, many ecolog-
ical and livelihood functions are lost (degradation of soil, loss of fertility and water retention)
(Martinez-Alier 2002).
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Commission on Dams recognizes that population living in the areas involved
in the projects have suffered forced displacement, loss of fishing and of pro-
ductive agriculture land due to flooding, salinization, and the lack of siltation
(Berkamp et al. 2000). Hundreds of protests are still in progress in many parts
of the world, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Finally, to a certain extent,
privatization of biological resources and extension of intellectual property rights
regimes might be included among the modern “enclosures” that benefit big
business to the detriment of small farmer by eroding free access to seeds, plants
and other genetic resources as well as by reducing quality of natural resources
(genetic variability and biodiversity)29. From all these examples it follows that
a model aiming at describing interactions between the production choices of the
rich and the poor should comprises a sector managed by the rich that produces
environmental externalities on the poor. The degree of such externalities will
depend on specialization in dirty or clean production and therefore it is likely
to vary from one country to another.
2.3.4 Ill-defined property rights
In the model, natural resources are represented by a free access renewable re-
source. Actually different property right regimes (open, private, public, and
communitarian) usually coexist, as well as very heterogeneous natural resources,
but the impossibility to introduce such a complex setting into a theoretical
model compels making a choice and assuming stable institutions is made: prop-
erty right regime does not change along the process of structural change. Given
that many developing countries are affected by ill defined property rights (and
it is particularly valid for the resource endowments of the poor), open access is
analyzed as an extreme case of this type of institutional failure. A comprehen-
29Pionetti’s study (2006) on dryland farming systems on South India’s Deccan Plateau, for
example, shows that the seed industry undermines the scope for farmers to save their own
seed through a mix of technological, legal and economic strategies: pureline breeding methods
or genetically engineered seed sterility; intellectual property rights regimes such as breeders’
rights and patents which make it illegal for farmers to reuse seeds; variety registration and
seed certification schemes backed by economic rules or subsidies. The result is a reduction of
genetic variability, deterioration of social and economic status of women as major autonomous
seed producers. Shiva (2005) is more incisive by denouncing the impact of seed multinationals
in India on poor farmers: she states that through a deceiving marketing, the help of public
subsidies and of patent legislation some multinationals (mainly Cargill and, Monsanto) have
transformed the farmers in their main buyers leading to a immiserazing process. Finally,
Bolivian quinoa, Amazonian ayahuasca, Peruvian maca and Indian chickpeas are all other
examples of resources that have been subject to intellectual property claims and that have
been considered a deprivation of knowledge and genetic resources of Indigenous peoples and
farming communities.
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sive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the effects of different
property right regimes in terms of distribution and sustainability is beyond the
scope of this paper. However some observations might be worth underlining.
Firstly different property rights regimes have been supposed to produce differ-
ent environmental impacts, but empirical evidences show a high heterogeneity
of outcomes. Given our focus on environmental dynamics, we have preferred to
distinguish the various scenarios in terms of environmental impact instead of in
terms of property rights regime avoiding any schematic parallelism between the
two factors.
Secondly, although with some caveats, depletion of free access renewable
natural resources might represent or embody several types of forces that can
prompt a negative structural change. The two main direct factors that Lo´pez
identifies as responsible of perverse structural change are natural resource degra-
dation and processes of disenfranchisement of part of the rural poor from access
to natural resources. From the examination of poor and rich producers’ envi-
ronmental impact, it follows that natural resource degradation might be caused
by different factors:
1) increasing pressures on natural resources because of demographic expan-
sion especially among populations that rely on primary activities;
2) production growth in a sector with environmental externalities in absence
of adoption of cleaner technologies or investments in resource preservation;
3) distributional changes in access to natural resources that also lead to en-
vironmental externalities (see below).
As seen above, processes of disenfranchisement of part of the rural poor from
access to natural resources can be produced by different factors:
1) expulsion of rural communities caused by an expansion in commodities
(cattle, mining, logging) activities under a regime of imperfect property
rights or under a legislation biased in favor of the commodity sector;
2) large investments in hydroelectric and irrigation projects or other large
infrastructures;
3) other types of enclosures of common goods;
4) civil wars and conflicts.
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In the model proposed we exclude conflicts. All remaining factors, leading to
push forces out of the traditional primary sector, are represented by a decrease in
the stock of a free access renewable natural resource. Actually not all phenomena
considered are strictly given by a reduction in open renewable resource but we
think that this choice can encompass a large part of such mechanisms:
1) In many cases a change in distribution of fixed resources, such as land
endowments, can be partially represented by a change in a renewable
natural resource, such as land quality: for example expulsion of poor rural
population from their lands because of a “beef boom” often translates in
migration toward fragile lands, so even if they can cultivate the same
amount of land, soil quality has declined. On the other hand, rich cattle
owners benefit from a higher land endowment that can be represented
by an increase in their total factor productivity. Thus, in this case the
dynamics can be represented by an expansion of a capitalistic sector that
causes environmental externalities on rural poor dwellers. To the extent
that agricultural frontier can be enlarged and property rights are not well
defined land is not properly a fixed resource.
2) People displacements often lead not only to distributional changes but also
degradation of natural resources. Large investments in mining, logging,
hydroelectric projects, irrigation projects are often responsible of severe
contaminations or environmental externalities harming also communities
that have not been dislocated, while displaced people are often responsible
of non-sustainable behaviors and practices because they settle in new and
unfamiliar areas, without knowing how long they will stay and because
community relations and social capital tend to deteriorate.
In the light of these observations, the choice of focusing on renewable re-
sources in a context of open access can be considered reasonable. The fact
remains that the introduction of alternative property right regime might be an
interesting extension for further research.
3 The model
We consider a small open economy with three factors of production: labor, a
free access renewable natural resource (E) and physical capital (K). In this
economy, agents belong to two different populations: the “Rich” (R-agents)
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and the “Poor” (P-agents). The R-agents accumulate physical capital, hire la-
bor force and employ all their potential work - represented by a fixed amount of
entrepreneurial activity - in the capitalistic sector producing a storable private
good. We call their production “capitalistic sector” or “market sector”. The
P-agents are endowed only with labor and they have to choose the distribu-
tion of their labor between two activities: working as employee for the Rich in
the capitalistic sector or directly exploiting natural resources to produce a non
storable good. Let “subsistence sector” or “rural sector” denote production of
the Poor. Given that the Poor cannot invest and accumulate physical capital,
we assume that the capital market is completely segmented and is accessible
only by the Rich.
3.1 The maximization problem of the Poor and the pro-
duction in the traditional sector
The population of the Poor is constituted by a continuum of identical individuals
and the size of the population is represented by the positive parameter N . The
P-population well-being depends on two goods:
1) A non storable good deriving directly from free access renewable natural
resources, hereafter referred to as environmental good.
2) A good (hereafter denoted private good) which can be consumed as a
substitute for the services coming from the environmental good.
We assume that the instantaneous utility function of each P-agent is the
following
Up(cp, cs) = ln(cp + acs) (1)
where:
cs : is the consumption of the produced good as a substitute for the environ-
mental good;
cp : is the consumption deriving from the exploitation of the environmental
resource.
According to (1), cs and cp are perfect substitutes, with a (constant) rate
of substitution equal to a > 0. That is, the private good produced by the
Rich is able to substitute completely cp. This is a stylized fact, but it can
represent the main components of poor people’s well-being: if they work in the
subsistence sector in rural areas (fishing, forestry, agriculture or breeding) their
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standard of living strictly depends on access to and exploitation of E; while if
they move to urban zones or they become wage labor force, they satisfy their
needs mainly through the consumption of private goods. Each P-agent, in each
instant of time, employs all her potential labor (that we normalize to unity) in
the subsistence sector or in the sector of the Rich. Thus, she cannot rely on
alternative income sources at the same time. However, in the absence of inter-
sectoral moving costs, significant divergences from the case with employment
diversification are not a priori expected. Therefore, for the sake of analytical
simplicity, the hypothesis of indivisible labor allocation will be kept.
Let us indicate with Np and NR the number of the Poor that work, respec-
tively, in the rural subsistence sector and in the capitalist sector. Consequently,
we have Np+NR = N . The aggregate function of production in the rural sector
is given by
YR = αNpE (2)
This specification was proposed by Schaeffer (1957) for fishery and since then
it has been widely adopted in literature in modelling natural resources (Munro
and Scott 1993, Conrad 1995, Brander and Taylor 1998a and 1998b, McAusland
2005, Lo´pez et al. 2007). We have assumed that the Poor cannot save and that
production is completely exhausted by their consumption. From equation (2),
it follows that per capita output and consumption for the Poor working in this
sector is equal to30
cp =
Yp
Np
= αE (3)
The Poor that are hired in the sector of market goods receive a real wage
equals to w (in terms of the private good produced by the Rich) that is consid-
ered as exogenously given. By (3), the Poor are indifferent between the work in
the traditional sector and that in the capitalistic one if and only if
cp = acs = aw (4)
which can be re-expressed as
1
a
αE = w (5)
30In the traditional sector the labor payment is not based on marginal product activity, but
on income sharing. Thus people that work in this sector receive the average product (Ray,
1998).
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If
1
a
αE > w (respectively,
1
a
αE < w), then no Poor (respectively all Poor, i.e.
N) would like to work in the capitalistic sector. We assume that E is taken
as exogenously given by the Poor, that is they do not internalize the impact
of their production on natural resources; however, we will return to this issue
later. In equation (5), the parameter a determines the difference between the
wage in the capitalistic sector and the average output in the rural sector that
allow for the same level of utility. The alignment of labor income between the
two sectors (from condition (5)) is consistent with the role of rural sector as
indicator of the labor opportunity cost31 in other sectors. In the economy, labor
supply is affected by two factors: on one hand, an increase in wage rate (due
for example to an augmentation in labor demand) represents a “pull” factor
of labor force; on the other one, negative externalities causing environmental
depletion constitute a “push” factor of labor force.
3.2 The production in the capitalistic sector
The population of the Rich is constituted by a continuum of identical individ-
uals and the size of the population is represented by the positive parameter
M . We normalize the size of the R-population by assuming M = 1. As said,
the representative R-agent employs all her fixed potential labor in the market
sector as entrepreneurial activity. Without loss of plausibility, we assume that
the marginal product of entrepreneurial labor in the market sector is higher
than the marginal product of labor in the subsistence sector. Therefore, the
possibility that the Rich work in the subsistence sector is excluded a priori and
the production function of the market sector can be specified as follows
YR = βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ (6)
where:
γ > 0, δ ≥ 0 and γ + δ < 1 (i.e. the production function satisfies the constant
31Lo´pez (2003) observes that in developing countries labour remuneration in primary sector
(especially traditional primary activities that use labour intensive techniques) is likely to
represent the basic opportunity cost or floor wage for unskilled labour and, correcting for
skill differentials, of the whole economy. Lo´pez and Anriquez (2007) show that in Chile
(1987-2003 period) the main channel through which agriculture growth reduces poverty is the
labour market: expansion of agriculture production raises wages and employment of unskilled
workers among whom poverty is more predominant, while effects on poverty through food
price channel is less relevant. In a study on sectoral composition of growth and poverty in
India, Datt and Ravallion (1998) find that growth in farm productivity contributes to poverty
alleviation both directly and by inducing a rise in the wage rate as well as a reduction in food
prices (although the price effect is lower).
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returns to scale assumption);
K: is the physical capital accumulated by the representative R-agent;
ND: is labor demand by the Rich;
β : is a positive parameter representing (exogenous) technical progress.
The function (6) is increasing in all its inputs, is concave and it satisfies
the Inada conditions in K and ND; while, as E approaches zero, its marginal
output tends to infinite only if δ > 0. If δ = 0, environmental resources do not
enter the production function of the Rich.
3.3 Asset accumulation
P and R-agents consider the effect of their choices on the environment as neg-
ligible and they do not internalize it; therefore, in their maximization problems
they take the evolution of E as given; that is, they behave without taking into
account the shadow value of the natural resource and so nobody has an incen-
tive to preserve or restore natural resources. Thus, investment in natural capital
does not affect the environmental stock and the dynamics of E can be described
by the usual logistic function modified for human intervention
·
E = E(E − E)− ²αNpE − ηY R (7)
where:
E is the carrying capacity of the environmental resource, that is the maximum
stock at which E stabilizes in absence of negative impacts due to P and R-
agents’ economic activities;
²αNpE
χ is the aggregate environmental impact by the rural sector and the
parameter ² > 0 represents exploitation of the natural resource by P-agents;
η > 0 is a parameter measuring the environmental deterioration caused by the
aggregate production Y R of R-agents. Assuming identical Rich agents, it follows
that Y R = YR.
As there is no investment in natural capital, the R-agent invests in physical
capital accumulation all she saves after her consumption expenditures and re-
muneration of the employed labor force. Therefore the stock of physical capital
grows according to the following equation
K˙ = βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ − wND − cR (8)
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3.4 The intertemporal maximization problem of the rep-
resentative R-agent
Preferences of the Rich are assumed to be representable by an utility function
defined over the consumption of the private good. Let the R-agent’s instanta-
neous utility be
Ur(cR) = ln cR (9)
Therefore UR is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave, that is U ′R > 0 and U
′′
R < 0. The representative R-agent
maximizes her utility by choosing cR and the labor demand ND, that is she
solves the following intertemporal optimization problem
Max
cR, ND
∫ ∞
0
(ln cR)e−rtdt (10)
under the constraints (7) and (8), where r > 0 is the discount rate. The solu-
tion to the R-agent’s problem is found considering the following current value
Hamiltonian function
H = ln cR+λ(βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ−wND− cR)+ θ(E(E−E)− ²αNpE− ηY R)
(11)
where λ and θ are the co-state variables associated to K and E, respectively.
It is easy to verify that the dynamics of λ, K and E do not depend on θ. In
fact, we have assumed that agents consider ²αNpE and Y R as given in the
maximization problem above and consequently the resulting dynamics are not
optimal; however, the trajectories under such dynamics are Nash equilibriums
(see Wirl 1997), in the sense that no (Rich or Poor) agent has an incentive to
modify her choices along each trajectory generated by the model as long as the
others do not modify theirs. The dynamics generated by the model are found
by applying the maximum principle
K˙ =
∂H
∂λ
= βKγEδ(ND)1−γ−δ − wND − cR (12)
·
E =
∂H
∂θ
= E(E − E)− ²αNpE − ηY R (13)
·
λ = rλ− ∂H
∂K
= λ
[
r − βγKγ−1Eδ(ND)1−γ−δ] (14)
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where cR, ND and Np are determined by the following conditions
∂H
∂cR
=
1
cR
− λ = 0 (i.e. cR = 1
λ
) (15)
∂H
∂ND
= λ(β(1−γ−δ)KγEδ(ND)−γ−δ−w) = 0 (i.e. β(1−γ−δ)KγEδ(ND)−γ−δ = w)
(16)
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wage is flexible. The equilib-
rium value of Np is given by the following labor market equilibrium condition
(obtained by equalizing left sides of (4) and (16))
α
a
E = β(1− γ − δ)KγEδ(N −Np)−γ−δ (17)
In particular, we obtain
Np = N −
[
aβ(1− γ − δ)
α
] 1
γ + δ
E
−
1− δ
γ + δ K
γ
γ + δ (18)
if the right side of (18) is not negative, otherwise Np = 0 (i.e. N Poor work
in the capitalistic sector). By substituting Np = 0 in (18) and solving it with
respect to K we get the curve which separates the region where Np > 0 from
that where Np = 0 in the plane (E,K)
K = L(E) :=
[
αN
γ+δ
aβ(1− γ − δ)
] 1
γ
E
1− δ
γ (19)
where
1− δ
γ
> 1.
Along and above the curve (19) it holds Np = 0. By substituting ND with
the equilibrium value of N −Np in (16) the equilibrium wage w is found and it
can be used in (12).
Finally, given that (ex-post) Y R is equal to YR, the dynamics generated by
the model are the following
K˙ = β(γ + δ)KγEδ(N −Np)1−γ−δ − 1
λ
(20)
·
E = E(E − E)− ²αNpE − ηβKγEδ(N −Np)1−γ−δ (21)
·
λ = λ(r − βγKγ−1Eδ(N −Np)1−γ−δ) (22)
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where Np = 0 for (E,K) above (19) while Np is given by (18) for (E,K) below
the curve (19). The following restrictions on variables and parameters hold: K,
E, λ > 0; a, α, β, γ, ², η, r, E, N > 0; δ ≥ 0, γ + δ < 1.
4 Basic mathematical results
In this section we analyze the existence ad stability of the fixed points (i.e. the
stationary states) of the dynamics of the model, obtained by imposing
·
E = 0,
K˙ = 0,
·
λ = 0 in the system (20)-(22). Note that, for λ > 0, equations
·
E = 0
and
·
λ = 0 depend only on E and K and consequently solving them we obtain
the fixed point values of E and K. The corresponding value of λ is obtained by
solving the equation K˙ = 0.
4.1 The case without specialization N > Np > 0
In the case without specialization (i.e. N > Np > 0), the condition
·
E = 0 is
satisfied along the graph of the function
K = F (E) := E
1− δ
γ
(
E − E − ²αN
M(βηM−γ−δ − ²α)
)γ + δ
γ
where M :=
(
aβ(1− γ − δ)
α
) 1
γ + δ , and the condition
·
λ = 0 is satisfied along
the graph of the function
K = G(E) :=
(
βγ
r
M1−γ−δ
)γ + δ
γ
E
2δ + γ − 1
γ + δ
Therefore, the intersections between F (E) and G(E) identify the fixed points
under the regime of no specialization. To state the existence and stability results
about these fixed points, we define the following threshold values
Ω := α
(
η
a(1− γ − δ) − ²
)
(23)
∆ :=
r
βγ
(
aβ(1− γ − δ)
α
)1− γ
γ
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N1 := ∆
γ
1− γ
[
δa
α[η − ²a(1− γ − δ)]
]1− γ − δ
1− γ
E1 :=
(
1 +
δ
1− γ − δ
)
[(
N1
)δ
∆γ
] 1
1− γ − δ
+ α²N
E2 :=
αηN
1− γ − δ +
(
1
N
δ
∆γ
) 1
1− γ − δ
According to the sign of the coefficient Ω (see 23), two regimes can be dis-
tinguished:
REGIME DCS (Dirty Capitalistic Sector)
We denote regime DCS (Dirty Capitalistic Sector) the scenario in which η,
the rate of environmental impact caused by the capitalistic sector, is relatively
high (ceteris paribus) in comparison to the environmental impact of the tradi-
tional sector, measured by ε. That is, it holds Ω > 0, where Ω > 0 ⇔ η
²
>
a(1− γ − δ).
REGIME DTS (Dirty Traditional Sector)
We denote regime DTS (Dirty Traditional Sector) the scenario in which:
Ω < 0.
Now we can state the following proposition. The proof of such proposition
requires straightforward but tedious calculations; so, due to space constraints,
we omit it.
Proposition 1 In the regime DCS (i.e. Ω > 0), two fixed points with N >
Np > 0 at most exist. In particular, if
N < N1, E1 < E < E2
then two fixed points exist; if
N ≤ N1, E ≥ E2
then one fixed point exists; no fixed point exists in the remaining cases.
In the regime DTS (i.e. Ω < 0), one fixed point with N > Np > 0 at most
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exists. In particular, if
E ≥ E2
then the fixed point exists; no fixed point exists in the remaining cases.
In the regime DCS (i.e. Ω > 0), if there exist two fixed points, in one of these
the curve G(E) intersects F (E) from above in the plane (E,K) (we will indicate
such point by the letter A) while in the other point (that we shall indicate by
B) the opposite holds; in A the value of E is lower than in B. If only one
fixed point is admissible, its configuration is like a point B, namely in it G(E)
intersects F (E) from below (see Figure 6 of the mathematical appendix). In
the regime DTS (i.e. Ω < 0), in the unique fixed point the curve G(E) intersects
F (E) from above.
Proposition 1 highlights that the fixed points with N > Np > 0 exist only
when the carrying capacity Eovercomes certain thresholds (E > E1 if Ω > 0
and E > E2 if Ω < 0). These thresholds are positively correlated to the rate of
environmental impact caused by the two sectors (² and η). Thus if the economic
activities are too polluting then stationary points with N > Np > 0 don’t exist.
The Proposition 1 also implies that it can always be found a E or N so that
there exist two fixed points if Ω > 0 and one fixed point if Ω < 0, namely the
maximum number of admissible stationary points.
Let (E∗,K∗, λ∗) denotes the fixed point value of the variables. The sta-
bility properties of fixed points depend on the signs of the eigenvalues associ-
ated to the Jacobian matrix J of the dynamical system (20)-(22) evaluated in
(K∗, E∗, λ∗). We define “reachable” a fixed point that has at least two eigenval-
ues with negative real parts, i.e. with a 2 or 3-dimensional stable manifold. As a
matter of fact, under the perfect foresight assumption, if the fixed point has a 2-
dimensional stable manifold, given the initial values K(0) and E(0) of the state
variables K and E, R-agents are able to fix the initial value λ(0) of the jumping
variable λ so that the growth trajectory starting from (E(0),K(0), λ(0)) ap-
proaches the fixed point. Therefore the fixed point can be reached by growth
trajectories. If the fixed point has a 3-dimensional stable manifold, given the
initial values K(0) and E(0) of state variables K and E, a continuum of initial
values λ(0) exist so that the growth trajectory starting from (K(0), E(0), λ(0))
approaches the fixed point.
Proposition 2 The fixed points without specialization (N > Np > 0) are char-
acterized by the following stability properties:
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In the regime DCS (i.e. Ω > 0), the fixed point A is always not reachable
while the fixed point B is always reachable if γ + 2δ − 1 < 0 while, if γ +
2δ − 1 > 0, the fixed point can be reachable or repulsive; however, if E∗ >
1
2
(
E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)
, it is reachable.
In the regime DTS (i.e. Ω < 0), the unique fixed point is always reachable.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Proposition 2, it follows that if the gap between the value of the
parameter E - denoting the carrying capacity - and E∗ is not too wide (namely
if E∗ >
1
2
(E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)), the fixed point B is reachable. As we will see in
the following sections, this gap depends on demographic pressure and on the
environmental impact of the production of the Poor and of the Rich because E∗
is decreasing in ², η and N . As long as the parameters ², η and N overcome a
certain threshold, the gap is such that the fixed point cannot be reached.
4.2 The case with specialization Np = 0
In this context, the condition
·
E = 0 is satisfied along the graph of the function
K = F0(E) :=
E
1− δ
γ (E − E)
1
γ
(ηβN
1−γ−δ
)
1
γ
while the condition
·
λ = 0 is satisfied along the graph of the function
K = G0(E) :=
(
βγ
r
N
1
γ
) 1
1− γ
E
δ
1− γ
Therefore the intersections between F0(E) and G0(E) identify the fixed
points under the regime of perfect specialization in the production of the capi-
talistic sector.
To state the following proposition, we define
Γ :=
1− γ − δ
2− 2γ + δ
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E0 :=
(
N
Γ
)θ

(
βγ
r
) 1
1− γ
γ
ηr
(1− Γ)

1− γ
2− 2γ − δ
N0 :=
ηr
γ
(1− Γ)
(
βγ
r
) 1
γ
(
αηΓΓ
a(1− Γ)(1− γ − δ)
)2γ + δ − 1
1− γ
By straightforward but tedious calculations, we can prove that:
Proposition 3 Two fixed points with Np = 0 at most exist. In particular, if
N < N0, E0 < E < E2
then two fixed point exist; if
E ≥ E2
then one fixed point exists; no fixed point exists in the remaining cases.
When two fixed points with specialization exist, in one of these points (the
fixed point that we will denote by A0) the graph of G0(E) intersects that of
F0(E) from above, viceversa in the other fixed point (which we will indicate by
B0) Furthermore, in A0 the value of E is lower than in B0. If only one fixed
point exists, its configuration is like a point A0 namely in this point G0(E)
intersects F0(E) from above (see Figure 7 of the mathematical appendix).
We can observe that N0 depends on r but not on N , while E2 depends on
N but not on r. Therefore Proposition 3 implies that, given E, there always
exist N and r such that at least one fixed point exists.
Proposition 4 The fixed point A0 is always not reachable, while B0 can be
reachable; in particular, it is always the case if
E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows that the fixed point with complete specialization can be reached
only when two fixed points with specialization exist, namely demographic pres-
sure and carrying capacity do not cross a certain threshold (respectively N0 and
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E2). Moreover, according to Proposition 4, E∗ has to be sufficiently high, i.e.
E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
. These are sufficient conditions so that the system
presents a reachable stationary state with disappearance of the traditional sec-
tor and a complete process of “proletarianization” with all the Poor employed
in the capitalistic production.
We can also investigate whether the existence of fixed points with Np = 0
is compatible with the existence of fixed points with Np > 0. The following
Proposition identifies sufficient conditions for the simultaneous existence of four
fixed points A, B, A0 and B0.
Proposition 5 If N1 < N < N0, max{E1, E0} < E < E2, Ω > 0 , then four
fixed points exist: A0 and B0 with Np = 0, A and B with Np > 0.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 3.
For a numerical example, see Figure 1. In a context with multiple reachable
fixed points, the choice between B and B0 depends on the initial conditions.
This is a typical example of path dependence: the initial value of E andK deter-
mine the fixed point (B or B0) that the growth trajectory will approach.These
findings are clearly shown by the numerical simulations showed in Figures 2-5.
In these Figures, the continuous (dotted) lines indicate values of E∗ and K∗
corresponding to reachable (respectively, unreachable) fixed points. Note that
for some values of η and E, the conditions set in Proposition 5 are satisfied:
four fixed points exist and the initial levels of E and K determine whether B
or B0 will be reached. Moreover, as E(η ) overcomes a minimum (maximum)
level, only B0-type fixed points with full specialization are compatible with the
dynamic system and are approached. Thus, point B0 can be generated as a
final step of an “excessive” depletion of the stock of environmental resources.
5 Comparative statics
This section studies the role played by the variation of some significant param-
eters of the model. in determining a structural change, that is a variation of
labor allocation between the two sectors of the economy, the traditional sector
and the traditional one. To this end, we focus our attention on the variations
of the coordinates of the reachable fixed point, in the context N > Np > 0.
In particular, we are interested to study the impact on R-agent’s consumption
and accumulation, P-agent’s consumption and labor allocation between the two
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sectors, as well as natural capital. The following Proposition helps to identify
the most significant variables that represent dynamics of the economy.
Proposition 6 The fixed point value of consumption c∗R of the Rich is positively
proportional to the fixed point value of physical capital K∗. More precisely, it
holds: c∗R =
(γ + δ)r
γ
K∗. The fixed point values of consumption c∗S of the Poor
working in the capitalistic sector and of consumption c∗P of the Poor working
in the traditional sector are positively proportional to the fixed point value of
natural capital E∗. More precisely, it holds: c∗S =
α
a
E∗ and c∗P = αE
∗.
This implies that the Rich are able to effectively face environmental degra-
dation through physical capital accumulation. It means that exogenous changes
leading to an increase in K∗ ensure a growing c∗R, even if E
∗ declines. This is
not the case for the Poor, whose well-being is positively proportional to E∗.
The above Proposition allows to focus on equilibrium values of N∗p , E∗ and
K∗. From these variables, the well-being of Poor and Rich agents can be com-
puted. In order to carry out some exercises of comparative statics, we study
how the functions that identify the loci where
·
E = 0 and
·
λ = 0 move in relation
to variations of parameters. The following proposition concerns the impact of
a change in the more significant parameters on N∗p , E∗ and K∗; the proof is
straightforward but tedious, so we omit it. Results are distinguished according
to the relatively more environmental demanding sector DCS (i.e. Ω > 0) and
DTS (i.e. Ω < 0) and according to the value of the expression γ + 2δ − 1, in-
troduced in Proposition 2, which can be interpreted as an indicator of modern
sector dependency on natural capital. It holds γ + 2δ − 1 > 0 if δ > 1− γ
2
,
where δ is the natural capital elasticity of the production function of the modern
sector. So a positive value of γ+2δ−1 indicates a “high” importance of natural
resources in the production process of the modern sector. We will indicate by
the symbol x ↑ (respectively, x ↓) an increase (respectively, a reduction) of x.
Proposition 7 1) If E ↑, then N∗P ↑, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↑ when γ+2δ−1 > 0 while
N∗P ↑, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↓ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0.
2) If ² ↑ or η ↑, then N∗P ↓, E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↓ when γ+2δ− 1 > 0 while N∗P ↓,
E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0.
3) If β ↑, then:
3.1) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↓ or K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 > 0 and Ω > 0.
3.2) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 > 0 and Ω < 0.
3.3) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↓ and K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0 and Ω > 0.
37
3.4) N∗P ↓, E∗ ↑ and K∗ ↓ or K∗ ↑ when γ + 2δ − 1 < 0 and Ω < 0.
The following sections discuss these comparative statics results.
6 Classification of structural changes
Comparative statics in the regime without specialization N > Np > 0 has shown
that a change in some parameters of the model causes an impact on the fixed
point value of N∗p ; that is, the economy reaches an equilibrium characterized by
a different labor allocation between the two sectors. Thus a structural change
comes out. The analysis focuses on structural changes in which labor shifts from
the traditional to the modern sector (namely with N∗p ↓). These transitions can
be classified in four different typologies:
1) Immiserizing structural change (ISC) N∗p ↓, E∗ ↓, K∗ ↑: labor moves
out from the subsistence sector, the stationary value of environmental stock
declines as well as Poor agents’ consumption, while the equilibrium phys-
ical capital and the Rich agent’s consumption grow. Thus, the structural
change is characterized by environmental degradation and increase in in-
equality. Rich is not negatively affected by environmental stress because
they partially substitute natural capital with physical capital and wage labor
employment.
2) Pro-poor Structural Change (PpSC) N∗p ↓, E∗ ↑, K∗ ↓: labor shift
is associated with a growth in the stationary value of natural capital and
with a decrease in physical capital. That is, structural change benefits the
Poor to detrimental of the Rich.
3) Positive Structural Change (PSC) N∗p ↓, E∗ ↑, K∗ ↑: in this case,
the structural change leads to a Pareto improvement. Both the Rich and
the Poor are benefited and environment is preserved.
4) Negative Structural Change (NSC) N∗p ↓, E∗ ↓, K∗ ↓: in this case,
environmental degradation push labor force to the capitalistic sector but
both the Rich and the Poor are harmed by the reduction in natural capital
endowment.
Comparative statics results of our model have shown that alternative sce-
narios can emerge. Table 1 and 2 associate to variations of parameters the
corresponding structural change type.
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Parameter Ω > 0 Typology Ω < 0 Typology
N∗p E
∗ K∗ N∗p ∆E
∗ K∗
E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC
β ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↑ l PpSC / PSC
η ↑ or ² ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC
Table 1: Comparative statics if γ + 2δ − 1 < 0
Parameter Ω > 0 Typology Ω < 0 Typology
N∗p E
∗ K∗ N∗p E
∗ K∗
E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ISC ↓ ↓ ↓ ISC
β ↑ ↓ ↓ l ISC /NSC ↓ ↑ ↑ PSC
η ↑ or ² ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ NSC ↓ ↓ ↓ NSC
Table 2: Comparative statics if γ + 2δ − 1 > 0
The following section attempts to schematize, highlight and discuss our find-
ings.
7 Interpretation of results
7.1 Classical context
As seen in the introduction, the bulk of contributions on structural change ne-
glects environmental dynamics. That is, environmental externalities of economic
activities are assumed to be equal to zero. Therefore, as technical progress in
the modern sector grows, the modern sector expands over time, population is
pulled by labor demand and no impact affects the environment. The result is
that the ecosystem is preserved, labor remuneration initially remains stable and
inequality increases but, when labor surplus is completely absorbed, labor earn-
ings start to grow too. In our model this scenario is represented by the effect of
an increase of β with η = 0 and ² = 0. In such context, the coordinates of the
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fixed point are
K∗ =
(
βγE
δ
(N −N∗p )1−γ−δ
r
) 1
1− γ
E∗ = E
λ∗ =
(
r
γ
) γ
1− γ 1
γ + δ
(
βE
δ
(N −N∗p )1−γ−δ
) 1
1− γ
where
(N −N∗p ) =
( a
α
1− γ − δ
)1− γ
δ
(γ
r
)γ
r β
1
δ E
γ + δ − 1
δ
Moreover the wage is given by
w = (1− γ − δ)
γ
r
β
1
γ

γ
1− γ (
E
N −N∗p
) δ
1− γ
It follows that an increase in β causes a rise in K∗, namely an improvement
in well-being of the Rich, while the natural capital is not affected by human
activities and it is equal to its carrying capacity E. Therefore the stationary
value of Poor agents’ welfare does not change. However, if the growth of β is
sufficiently high to lead to a full specialization in the capitalistic sector the wage
rate will be defined as follows
w = (1− γ − δ)
γ
r
β
1
γ

γ
1− γ (
E
N
) δ
1− γ
That is, w is positively linked to β. Consequently as β grows, labor remuneration
increases too.
7.2 Dual context
Most of two-sectors models with environmental externalities (e.g. Eliasson and
Turnovsky 2004, Lo´pez et al. 2007) distinguish between a clean and non-
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resource sector (it comprises activities that do not employ natural capital neither
pollute) and a dirty resource sector (i.e. activities that use natural resources
as input of production and that cause an environmental impact). Under some
assumptions on the values of parameters, our model can reflect these charac-
terizations. Given that the traditional sector tends to be more dependent on
natural resources, in our model this case occurs when η = δ = 0 (where η and δ
are respectively the environmental impact and natural capital elasticity of the
capitalistic sector production) and consequently Ω < 0 and γ+2δ−1 = γ−1 < 0.
However, differently from Eliasson and Turnovsky’s and Lo´pez’s models, in our
context this specification is not neutral from a distributional point of view. In-
deed, it implies that the production of the Poor represents the dirty sector,
while the R-agent is involved in clean production. In this context, consistently
with other models, an increase in β leads to a positive structural change and
the economy tends to a fixed point with a higher level of natural and physi-
cal capital, so well-being of the Poor and the Rich agents increases. However,
if the movement of labor is caused by an increase in environmental pressures
(for example ² ↑ - i.e. the environmental impact of the traditional sector rises-
or E ↓ - i.e. carrying capacity decreases), the final result is an immiserizing
structural change: the traditional sector is affected by the reduction in natural
capital, while the Rich are not harmed. Indeed, the capitalistic sector is ben-
efited by the access to labor at low cost and this, in turn, produces incentives
for investment in physical capital. Both structural changes are positive for the
representative Rich agent but the results in terms of the capitalistic sector out-
put are different. Note that labor productivity in the modern sector is equal to
β(1 − γ − δ)Kγ(N − Np)−γ−δ. Thus, even if β ↑, ² ↑ or E ↓ lead to the same
labor shift, in the first scenario labor productivity grows more than in the other
cases. Therefore, the immiserizing structural change leads to an expansion of
the capitalistic sector associated with a lower labor productivity than in the
positive structural change.
7.3 Interdependent context
The economy represented by our model is characterized by a more complex
context: both sectors produce and are affected by natural resource degradation.
The analytical study of our model has shown that alternative scenarios can
emerge.
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7.3.1 How much the environment matters for the Poor and for the
Rich
The basic hypothesis of this work is the non-homogenous distribution of assets.
The model analyzes a stylized case in which physical capital is completely con-
centrated in the endowments of a social class (the upper class), while all agents
have access to environmental capital. Although this is a highly stylized fact, it
reflects the ways in which different assets (natural, physical, social, human cap-
ital) are typically distributed. Physical capital tends to have a low dispersion
across the population because of financial market failures. In absence of perfect
information and competition, the wealthier individuals and large firms have a
privileged access to capital market, because they are more endowed with collat-
eral and they have a higher ability to exploit scale economies. Conversely, the
services coming from environmental resources may be more dispersed and tend
to have characteristics of public goods (in our model all agents have access to
environmental capital). In this context, economic agents also differ in feed-back
mechanisms and interactions between their choices of production (consumption)
and environmental dynamics. The case with γ+2δ−1 < 0 (namely the modern
sector has a relatively low dependence on natural resources) sheds light on the
consequences determined by the initial hypothesis of physical asset concentra-
tion and free access environmental capital. From Proposition 7 it follows that
in this context the model tends to be a zero-sum game. Physical capital endow-
ments allow the Rich to employ wage labor too and this possibility lies at the
roots of a conflict between the Rich (labor employers), and the Poor (labor force
providers). The Rich are more able to defend themselves from environmental
degradation because they can partially substitute natural capital with physical
capital or wage labor employment. Thus, the Rich are not disadvantaged by the
environmental degradation because they can rely on substitution possibilities as
a defensive strategy. On the contrary, they may benefit from the role played by
the natural capital scarcity in accelerating human resources mobilization and
shift of labor supply from the traditional sector to the modern one. Therefore
they take advantage of the possibility to exploit labor at a lower cost. This, in
turn, generates incentives to physical capital accumulation. On the other hand,
the poor are harmed because they face a reduction in productivity of their labor,
namely of their major mean of subsistence. In this context a reduction of the
environmental impact of the economic activities (i.e. a reduction of ² or η) or an
increase in the carrying capacity E not only help preservation of environment
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(equilibrium stock of natural capital grows), but they have a distributive impact
too.
7.3.2 Conditions for positive structural change
The comparative statics of an increase in β pinpoints the consequences of con-
sidering environmental dynamics. According to the mainstream view, a growth
in total factor productivity of the modern sector is always seen as a positive fac-
tor leading to growth and, at least in the long term, poverty reduction. On the
contrary, our model shows that this scenario can occur only if the modern sector
has a relatively low environmental impact in comparison to the traditional one
(i.e. Ω < 0). In this case, a rise in β determines an increase in labor produc-
tivity in the market sector leading to a growth in wage of workers employed by
the Rich as well as an augmentation of c∗R. At the same time, the movement of
labor caused by an increase in labor demand reduces the demographic pressures
on natural resources with positive effect on labor productivity in the subsistence
sector too. In particular, the following result holds:
Proposition 8 β ↑ and Ω < 0 are necessary conditions for a positive structural
change, that is a labor transition to the capitalistic sector associated with an
increase in well-being for the Poor and the Rich agents. In all other cases, a
parameter variation that causes a labor shift to the capitalistic sector leads to
an immiserizing or a negative transition driven by push forces.
Other variations of the parameters (for example an increase in carrying ca-
pacity or a reduction in rates of environmental impact ² or η) lead to higher
level of natural and physical capital but they are not accompanied by a process
of proletarianization. Proposition 8 highlights a novel requirement for positive
structural changes: labor reallocation towards the non subsistence sector can
lead to poverty reduction only if the capitalistic sector is not too polluting,
namely it produces relatively low environmental externalities in comparison to
the traditional activities. The positive structural change also represents the
labor transition associated with the highest level of labor productivity because
it occurs when there is a growth of total factor productivity as well as of all
productive inputs. Therefore the positive structural change also insures the
best economic performances of the capitalistic sector in comparison to the other
typologies of SC. Looking at policy implications, we can conclude that, in a
country with high income and asset concentration and where the capitalistic
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sector is quite polluting or environment demanding, measures for controlling
environmental externalities of the capitalistic sector are necessary not only for
sustainability, but also for economic growth and poverty alleviation. Therefore
policies aiming at promoting a positive structural change require that govern-
ment support to capitalistic sector productivity (such as incentives, direct and
indirect subsidies for capital accumulation, financial grants, tax exemptions,
public credit, favorable regulations, financing of infrastructures and so on) does
not include measures too permissive in terms of environmental externalities32.
7.3.3 Undesirable economic growth
Not only an increase in β might fail to trigger off positive structural change,
but it can also cause an immiserizing structural change (refer to Propositions 7
and 8). In particular, we focus on effects of an increase in β in a DCS regime.
This case clearly shows that, when we consider distributive and environmental
dynamics in a joint framework, some scenarios neglected by the literature can
emerge. The economic literature in general agrees that economic growth is
a not a sufficient condition for reducing poverty, but distributional dynamics
play a decisive role in shaping effects of economic growth on poverty rates.
A stylized fact commonly accepted is that negative rates of economic growth
tend to disproportionately hit lower income quintiles, but at the same time a
positive performance may neglect the poorest. However, in practice, economic
growth remains one of the main goals pursued by national governments and
international institutions. Although a positive trend in GDP growth does not
insure per se an increase in well-being of the Poor, it is seen as a necessary
condition. This entails that policies aiming at stimulating economic growth
are consistent with objectives of poverty reduction that, in turn, is likely to
result in relieving pressures on natural resources and in helping environmental
conservation. On the contrary, the consequences of an increase in β when Ω > 0
raise doubts about this expected virtuous relationship between economic growth,
poverty reduction and preservation of ecosystems. Indeed, in this scenario the
environmental externalities may contribute to generating an undesirable and
self-reinforcing path of expansion of the modern sector associated with a process
of impoverishment33: the capitalistic sector grows producing push forces on
32Environmental externalities can be represented by resource contamination or depletion
but also, adopting a broader definition, by expulsion of other users from the access to natural
resources.
33Models that predict scenarios with undesirable economic processes are not new in litera-
ture. Actually, Antoci (1996), Antoci and Bartolini (1999, 2004), Antoci (2008) and Antoci
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the Poor due to the environmental pressures, labor moves out the subsistence
sector and the capitalistic sector further expands. This unexpected result may
be explained by the fact that positive impact of a growing β on the wage is
overcome by down pressures on w because of the environmental degradation
caused by the modern sector’s expansion. Thus, an increase in β may reduce
well-being of the Poor if it is not accompanied by counterbalancing factors
such as a rise in α (i.e. total factor productivity of the traditional sector) or
a reduction in η (i.e. environmental impact of the capitalistic sector). The
parameters α and β can be affected by public investments. Therefore, looking
at the policy implications of these findings, it could be argued that governments
should take into account the possibility of such perverse mechanisms in their
decisions about allocation of public expenditure. If the public funds focus only
on the modern sector neglecting productivity of the subsistence sector, the result
may be an immiserizing growth, namely an output growth that worsens income
distribution 34.
7.3.4 Consequences of a high dependence on natural resources
From Proposition 7 it follows that if the modern sector is more resource-based
(i.e. γ+2δ−1 > 0) the Rich are more vulnerable to environmental degradation.
et al. (2005, 2008) propose models in which negative externalities may constitute an engine
of economic growth. In their models, economic growth produces negative externalities that
reduce the capacity of natural or social environment to provide free goods. Agents try to
defend themselves from well-being losses by increasing their labor supply in order to rise their
consumption of private goods that are substitute of free access goods. This, in turn, leads
to economic growth. As result, defensive strategies generate a growth path that is Pareto
dominated in terms of well-being.
34Claims of representatives of organisations of peasants, fisher peoples, victims of tsunami
(Via Campesina, World Forum of Fisher Peoples) can be interpreted also in the light of these
findings. In the final declaration of Regional Conference on Rebuilding Peasants’ and Fisher-
folk’s Livelihoods After the Earthquake and Tsunami Catastrophes (Medan-Indonesia, 17-19
February 2005) the following statements can be read: After the terrible destruction caused by
the quake-induced tsunami, hundreds of thousands of victims have had to flee their homes,
their fishing grounds and farmlands and shift to relief camps, leading to a great sense of despair
and despondency in having to depend on charity and others for their living. This condition
has only been worsened by the attempts of governments in some tsunami-hit countries to clear
the beaches and coastal areas in the name of tsunami-preparedness, preventing coastal com-
munities from exercising control of, and access to, traditional sources of beach-based economic
activities, while simultaneously planning to hand them over to corporate and business interests
in the tourism, industrial fisheries and aquaculture, and maritime industries....... Rehabilita-
tion and reconstruction activities in the affected coastal areas should give utmost priority to
traditional, artisanal, small-scale communities relying on beach-based fishing activities, and
not to large scale mechanized fishing vessels or industrial aquaculture farms.......We reject aid
for the affected coastal fishing communities that are not locally appropriate or designed to
suit the needs of beach-based labor-intensive fishing practised by most coastal fishing commu-
nities in the affected regions, in contrast to the harbour-based fishing prevalent in the donor
countries (www.viacampesina.org).
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In this context, a variation in parameters produces an impact with the same sign
to the Rich and the Poor, namely their utility are positively correlated. Thus, a
reduction of E, due to a decrease in the carrying capacity or to an increase in η or
², leads the economy to stationary states associated with lower level of well-being
both for the Poor and for the Rich because natural resources are relevant for
their production activity. Therefore, in the long run, environmental policies may
be win-win strategies. In this context there is not a trade-off between goals of
poverty alleviation, economic growth and environmental preservation, but they
require similar interventions (such as measures for raising carrying capacity
or legislation, controls and incentives for adoption of sustainable practices or
technologies that reduces η or ²).
7.3.5 Effects of resource abundance and environmental preservation
Proposition 7 provides information on the relationship between resource abun-
dance and structural change. According to these findings, in all scenarios we
have that E ↑, ² ↓ or η ↓ lead to E∗ ↑ and N∗p ↑. Thus, scarcity of natural
resources represents a push force of labor factor towards the capitalistic sector,
while natural capital abundance (given by a high endowment of natural capi-
tal stock or a low environmental impact of human action) tends to delay labor
shift to the modern sector and physical capital accumulation while at the same
time reducing poverty. If the modern sector is seen as engine of growth, our
results are consistent with the “resource curse hypothesis”. At the same time,
unlike this literature, in our model agents’ well-being and economic growth are
not always coincident: natural capital abundance is not a curse but a resource
against processes of impoverishment even if it can be an obstacle to economic
growth. However, though our findings recall this literature, some differences
have to be considered. Studies on “resource curse” have focused on settings
that are not likely to be represented by high E. In our model, the environmen-
tal resources are public goods that all agents have access to, while well resource
endowed countries have been identified according to per capita land (Wood and
Berge 1997), primary export share (Sachs and Warner 1997) or abundance of
point resources (mining, oil and, in a certain measure, plantations)35. However
the use of per capita land as a proxy of resource wealth does not capture dis-
35Mineral resources, oil, plantations which require immediate processing can be considered
examples of “point” resources because their rents and sources are not diffuse, but they are
concentrated. These sectors are typically characterized by concentrate ownership and capital
intensive production processes.
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tributive aspects, while point resources are more likely to be appropriated by a
narrow elite and export oriented primary activities can be assimilated to what
we have called “modern” sector: they often adopt capital intensive techniques of
production, employ wage workers and are managed by the rich. In these cases
environmental resources are not public but excludible goods that are mainly
enjoyed by the rich. Therefore it can be concluded that, even if our results are
not tested by the studies on performance of resource-rich countries in terms of
poverty and inequality, they are not in opposition to this literature. Moving to
change in labor allocation, we observe that the positive (negative) relationship
between ² and η (respectively, E) and “proletarianization” is consistent with
the empirical evidences in many countries. Chopra and Gulati (2001) show
that, in India’s arid and semiarid regions, environmental degradation tends to
force people to move to urban areas during time of distress, especially during
droughts, while measures reducing environmental pressures lead to a decrease
in migration flows. In Nepal, out-migration to seek wage employment is one of
the strategies adopted by farmers in the hills to cope with soil erosion and land
degradation that is due to bad land use practices and to natural factors (World
Bank, 1995). The investigations on environmental degradation and migration
between the US and Mexico (Schwartz and Notini 1994) confirmed that the in-
ability to make living from the land due to dry conditions and processes of soil
erosion contribute to the decision of rural people to migrate. Similar evidences
are found also in Africa where climate variability, climate change and unsus-
tainable human activities (overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, and poor
irrigation practices) lead to an increasing process of desertification that forces
people to emigrate both in other rural and urban areas (UNCCD, 2005). Fi-
nally, a cross-country analysis, conducted by Shandra et al. (2003) on a panel of
fifty-eight developing countries, finds that deforestation exerts a positive effect
on over-urbanization whereas environmental sustainability produces a negative
impact on over-urbanization. According to these results, developing countries
suffering environmental degradation would be prone to over-urbanization. En-
vironmental pressures of the poor might be worsened by the fact that rises in
η and ² are likely to occur at the same time. As already noted, environmental
stress caused by the Rich may lead to the disruption of sustainable traditional
institution, a process of migration of the Poor in fragile areas, further impover-
ishment which induces short-sighted choices and higher environmental pressures
(Lo´pez 1998). If γ + 2δ − 1 < 0, this may exacerbate the increase in income
distribution inequality produced directly by the environmental impact of the
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market sector. In fact, cp declines, while the consumption level of the Rich
is not negatively affected by environmental pressures because they can rely on
physical capital accumulation and employment of wage labor.
8 Possible extensions of the model
The model examines a simplified economy and a perfect polarization between
the representative agents. The purpose was to identify and focus to some links
between asset distribution, well-being and environmental dynamics that are
likely to be relevant in developing countries, but implications drawn from this
analysis cannot be considered exhaustive. Indeed, some important aspects that
might deserve further attention in future extensions of the model can be cited:
1)In the model the capitalistic sector is interpreted as the combination of
the modern activities and what we have called the sector of informal small en-
terprises. The labor market is perfectly competitive with flexible wages and
full employment. Labour supply is determined by conditions in the subsistence
rural sector and it is completely absorbed by the sector of the Rich. Conversely,
if wages were rigid or they could not decrease below a minimum level, a labor
surplus would emerge and would lead to a better sectorial diversification be-
tween the modern and the informal urban activities. In this case, it would be
interesting to analyze changes in dynamics generated by our model in terms of
distributional and environmental impact. Under the assumption of wage rigidity
or the existence of minimum wages, the linkage between the negative externali-
ties and production in the modern sector may weaken and it should be possible
to highlight wage differentials and, in particular, between the agents working in
the subsistence or informal sectors and employees in the modern sector.
2) This is a model of supply-led growth and well-being, and the role of
private demand is neglected. In fact, an increase in income inequality and a
further impoverishment of the working class may depress demand and inhibit
economic growth. It would be interesting to develop the present model including
the impact of inequality and poverty on growth through the channel of domestic
demand (forward and backward linkages between the sectors). However, it has
been noted that several countries have undertaken trade liberalization reforms
and, consequently, the importance of the domestic market has diminished, at
least for the traded sectors. In open economies, a factor for export-led economic
growth is production competitiveness that is partially represented in the model
48
through labor costs. As already underscored, the model also neglects the role of
the traditional sector as supplier of food (i.e. wage goods), but in open middle-
income countries the channel of food prices in boosting industrialization and
economic growth is less likely to operate.
3) Given that many developing countries are affected by ill-defined property
rights, open access has been studied as an extreme case of this institutional
failure. Moreover many environmental services or goods are public goods: some
examples are the mitigation of floods and drought, soil renewal, provision of
fuels, energy, fresh water and biodiversity, and marine resources. Anyway, the
introduction of another type of natural asset characterized by common or pri-
vate property (for example land) could be investigated in order to assess whether
other property right regimes are likely to lead to different findings. Final results
can be expected to depend on the assumptions related to the initial distribution
of natural resources, while the choice of the property regime typology might
be less informative in terms of environmental outcomes. A great attention has
been devoted to the theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of property
or tenure right regime on incentives for environmental preservation, short- or
long-run strategies, free-riding or collective actions. However we believe that it
is not possible to classify the regimes according to the environmental degrada-
tion that are likely to produce. Bromley (2006), for example, demonstrates the
plausibility of the degradation of Africa commons arising from factors outside
the commons (namely market forces, isolation and general institutional arrange-
ments at nation-state level) rather than arising from standard accounts of self-
ish behavior within the commons. At the same time, the relationship between
privatization of common property resources (or the formalization of individual
titles) and investment in land has been challenged by many authors36 (Atwood
1990, Carter and Olinto 2003, de Janvry et al. 2001, Deininger and Feder 2001,
Fitzpatrick 2005, Migot-Adholla et al. 1991, Place and Hazell 1993, Sjaastad
and Bromley 1997 and 2000), while the literature has emphasized that a com-
munity’s ability to properly manage environmental resources might depend on
36According to Baland and Platteau (1996), to be efficient, privatization programs have
to ensure well defined property rights, all markets have to exist and to be competitive, and
transaction costs for the enforcement of property rights must be absent. Most of developing
countries fail to verify these conditions: input and capital markets are imperfect and seg-
mented, the dismantling of traditional systems can increase the transaction costs and lead to
conflicts over resources and to violent reactions by those who are excluded, the State is often
not able to assign clear and defined titles, while privatization tends to privilege the political
and economic elites who may use resources for non-productive purposes (rent-seeking activi-
ties, hedge against inflation, speculative or privilege purposes etc). For a review of the studies
on the relationship between titling and land investment incentives see Bromley (2007).
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several conditions37. Therefore we have preferred to focus the analysis on a
open-access regime and to successively analyze different scenarios according to
the exogenous rate of environmental impacts (² and η) instead of endogenously
deriving incentives for investment in ecosystem preservation. Nevertheless the
comparison with other tenure right arrangements could provide interesting sug-
gestions.
4) In this model, natural capital has two main peculiarities: firstly, it is a
public free access resource whose services are used by the whole population, Poor
people included; secondly, it is subject to underinvestment and overexploitation
problems because it produces positive externalities and it is affected by negative
externalities. The present model could be modified by including other public
goods (R & D, infrastructures, development and strengthening of institutions
etc) whose benefits are distributed across all the population or other assets with
characteristics of semi-public goods such as human capital.
9 Conclusions
Nowadays no development strategy can avoid considering environmental dynam-
ics, externalities of human activities under a distributive perspective. Environ-
mental problems (the depletion of marine stocks, soil erosion, land degradation,
lost of forests and biodiversity, air contamination, global warming effects and
ocean acidification) have become a major concern in the international agenda,
while the poor, not only tend to rely more than the rich on natural resources but
they also are less able to defend themselves from environmental degradation.
This article has attempted to study the linkage between environmental re-
sources and labor and output composition by taking into account two main fac-
tors that have been partially neglected by the economic development literature:
the environmental externalities of human activities and agent’s heterogeneity
in terms of asset endowment and, consequently, in terms of income source and
vulnerability to depletion of natural resources. The proposed model have shown
that the introduction of these factors adds new elements in the analysis of these
link and permits to shed light on agents’ differences in feed-back mechanisms
and interactions between their choices and environmental dynamics. We have
proposed a taxonomy of structural changes on the basis of distributive, environ-
mental and economic impact and we have attempted to identify under which
37For a review of literature on itra-community governance issues see Agrawal (2001), while
for the role of external forces refer to Engel and Lo´pez (2004) and Bromley (2006a).
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conditions each SC can occur. Firstly, the work has identified new require-
ments for prompting positive structural changes, i.e. a movement of labor to
capitalistic activities associated with poverty reduction and the alleviation of
environmental pressures. In particular, the capitalistic sector has to produce a
relatively low impact on natural resources. Secondly, we have found that the ex-
istence of counter-intuitive results cannot be excluded: an increase in total factor
productivity of the capitalistic sector (or other factors leading to the growth of
this sector) might stimulate a self-reinforcing and immiserizing growth, namely
an output growth that results in a further impoverishment of the poor and in a
worsening of income distribution. This finding suggests that proper caution is
to be adopted in designing government measures which emphasize only physi-
cal capital accumulation or expansion of the market sector with the purpose of
alleviating poverty via economic growth. Indeed, some “collateral” effects may
jeopardize the benefits of economic growth causing environmental degradation
and impoverishment processes.
10 Appendix
10.1 Proof Proposition 2
Recalling the definition of M and noticing that Np = N −MK
γ
γ + δ E
δ − 1
γ + δ
the dynamic system becomes
K˙ = β(γ + δ)K
γ
γ + δ E
2δ + γ − 1
γ + δ M1−γ−δ − 1
λ
(24)
·
E = E(E − E)− ²αN +K
γ
γ + δ E
δ − 1
γ + δM(²α− ηβM−γ−δ) (25)
·
λ = λ
r − βγK− δγ + δ E 2δ + γ − 1γ + δ M1−γ−δ
 (26)
Let (K∗, E∗, λ∗) denotes the fixed point values of (K,E, λ). Remember that
fixed points of our sistem correspond to the intersections between the graphs of
the functions K = F (E) and K = G(E) occurring below the curve K = L(E)
in the plane (E,K) (see Figure 6) It is easy to check that Figure 6 shows
all possible configurations of curves K = F (E) and K = G(E); in such figure,
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E1 :=
1− δ
1 + γ
(E−²αN) indicates the value of E maximizing F (E); furtheremore,
when the curve K = L(E) is not drawn, this means that both the intersections
between K = F (E) and K = G(E) occur below K = L(E); that is, both
intersections give rise to fixed points in the regime N > Np > 0.
Before calculating the Jacobian matrix, we note that from (25) and (26) it
follows that in the fixed point it holds
1
λ
=
r(γ + δ
γ
K∗ (27)
and
N −N∗p =
E − E∗ − ²αN
Ω
By straightforward calculations we now find the Jacobian matrix evaluated
at the steady state (J∗)
J∗ =
 h
∗
K h
∗
E h
∗
λ
f∗K f
∗
E f
∗
λ
g∗K g
∗
E g
∗
λ

where
h∗K = r
h∗E =
r(γ + 2δ − 1)K∗
γE∗
h∗λ =
1
λ2
=
(
r(γ + δ)K∗
γ
)2
f∗K = −
γ
γ + δ
E∗(N −N∗p )Ω
K∗
f∗E = (1 + γ)
E1 − E∗
γ + δ
f∗λ = 0
g∗K =
γδ
(K∗)2(γ + δ)2
g∗E = −
γ
(γ + δ)2
γ + 2δ − 1
E∗K∗
g∗λ = 0
Therefore, h∗K , h
∗
λ and g
∗
K are always positive, h
∗
E and ρ := γ + 2δ − 1 have
the same sign, g∗E and ρ have opposite sign, f
∗
K and E1 − E∗ have the same
sign, f∗K and Ω have the opposite sign.
In order to study the stability properties of fixed points, we apply the
methodology proposed by Wirl (1997). The eingenvalues of the system are
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the roots of the following characteristic polynomial
P (z) = z3 − z2tr(J∗) + zM2 − |J∗|
where
tr(J∗) = k∗k+f
∗
E+g
∗
λ |J∗| = h∗λ(f∗Kg∗E−f∗Eg∗K) M2 = −h∗λg∗K+h∗Kf∗E−h∗Ef∗K
Therefore, the following results can be easily proved.
Lemma 1 If E∗ < E1, then tr(J∗) > 0.
Lemma 2 If Ω > 0, then |J∗| < 0 in A and |J∗| > 0 in B.
If Ω < 0, in the unique admissible fixed point it holds |J∗| > 0.
Lemma 3 If ρ < 0, then M2 < 0.
If ρ > 0 and Ω < 0, then M2 < 0.
If ρ > 0 and Ω > 0, a sufficient condition forM2 < 0 is E∗ >
1
2
(
E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)
.
It is now possible to discuss stability properties of A andB, in the regime Ω >
0, and of the unique admissible point in the regime Ω < 0. As explained in the
main text, we define “reachable” those fixed points with at least two eigenvalues
with negative real parts, i.e. with a 2 or 3-dimensional stable manifold.
10.1.1 Stability analysis of A
In A, it holds |J∗| < 0; therefore, such fixed point may be unreachable (a
saddle point with two positive eingenvalues) or locally attractive (i.e. a sink).
Conditions for local attractivity are (Wirl, 1997): tr(J∗) < 0, |J∗| < 0 and
M2 < 0. Figure 6 shows that the fixed point A can assume two possible
configurations. In the cases (a) and (b), it holds ρ < 0; thus, from Lemma 3, it
follows that M2 < 0, therefore A cannot be attractive. This implies that A is
unreachable. In the cases (e) and (f), in A it holds E∗ < E1; this implies, by
Lemma 1, that tr(J∗) > 0. Thus A cannot be attractive and it is unreachable.
In short, the fixed point A is always not reachable.
10.1.2 Stability analysis of B and of the fixed point in the regime
Ω < 0
In B and in the fixed point in the regime Ω < 0 it holds |J∗| > 0; therefore,
such fixed points can be repulsive or reachable (Wirl 1997). Wirl finds that a
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positive determinant and a negative coefficient M2 are sufficient conditions for
saddle point stability (i.e. for reachability). Given Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, this
happens when ρ < 0 (Figure 6, cases a-d) or when ρ > 0 and Ω < 0 (Figure
6, case h). If ρ > 0 and Ω > 0, the sign of M2 is not univocally determined.
Consequently, in this case, B can be repulsive or reachable. However, by Lemma
3, E∗ >
1
2
(
E − ²αN − rδ
γ
)
is a sufficient condition for saddle point stability
(Figure 6, cases e-g); this completes the proof of Proposition 2.
10.2 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to study the stability proprieties of fixed points in the reime Np = 0, we
calculate the Jacobian matrix J∗0 evaluated at a fixed point (K
∗, E∗, λ∗) with
Np = 0
J∗0 =
 h
∗
0K h
∗
0E h
∗
0λ
f∗0K f
∗
0E f
∗
0λ
g∗0K g
∗
0E g
∗
0λ

Remembering that r − βγKγ−1EδN1−γ−δ = 0, we have
h∗0E =
rδ(γ + δ)K∗
γE∗
> 0
h∗0K = (γ + δ)r > 0
h∗0λ =
r2(γ + δ)2(K∗)2
γ2
> 0
f∗0E = E(1− δ)− (2− δ)E∗ > 0, if E∗ < EM :=
E(1− δ)
2− δ
f∗0K = −ηr < 0
f∗0λ = 0
g∗0E = −
γδ
(γ + δ)K∗E∗
< 0
g∗0K =
γ(1− γ)
(γ + δ)(K∗)2
> 0
g∗0λ = 0
Let us first consider tr(J∗0 ) = h
∗
0K + f
∗
0E .
Figure 7 shows all possible configurations of the fixed points with Np =
0. Remember that fixed points correspond to the intersections between the
graphs of the functions K = F0(E) and K = G0(E) occurring above the curve
K = L(E) in the plane (E,K). In such figure, EM indicates the value of E
maximizing F0(E); furtheremore, when the curve K = L(E) is not drawn, this
means that both the intersections between K = F0(E) and K = G0(E) occur
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above K = L(E); that is, both intersections give rise to fixed points in the
regime Np = 0.
Note that in A0 it holds E∗ < EM ; therefore f∗0E > 0 and tr(J
∗
0 ) > 0 (see
cases a-b in Figure 7).
In Figure 7a, in B0 it holds E∗ < EM ; therefore f∗0E > 0 and tr(J
∗
0 ) > 0.
In Figure 7b, in B0 it holds E∗ > EM ; therefore f∗0E < 0 and the sign of tr(J
∗
0 )
is not univocally determined.
Let us now analyze the sign of |J∗0 | = h∗0K(f∗0Kg∗0E − f∗0Eg∗0K). We can
observe that in A0 it holds F0E > G0E , while in B0 it holds F0E < G0E , where
F0E = − f0E
g0K
and G0E = − g0E
g0K
. It follows that |J∗0 | < 0 in A0 while |J∗0 | > 0
in B0. If only one fixed point exists (Figure 7c), then in such point it holds
F0E < G0E and consequently |J∗0 | > 0.
Let us consider
M02 = −h∗0λg∗0K+h∗0Kf∗0Ef∗0K = −
r2(γ + δ)
γ(1− γ) +r(γ+δ)(E(1−δ)−(2−δ)E
∗)+
δηr2(γ + δ)K∗
γE∗
Replacing K∗ =
γ(E − E∗)
rη
, we obtain
M02 = − r
2(γ + δ)
γ(1− γ) + (E(1− δ)− (2− δ)E∗) + δ(E − E∗) > 0
if E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
.
10.2.1 Stability analysis of A0
Since in A0 it holds |J∗0 | < 0, such fixed point can be a saddle point with two
positive eingenvalues or a sink. Given that tr(J∗0 ) > 0, local attractivity is
excluded and the fixed point A0 is always not reachable.
10.2.2 Stability analysis of B0
In B0 we have |J∗0 | > 0; therefore such fixed point can be repulsive or reachable
(Wirl 1997). If E∗ >
1
2
(E− r
γ(1− γ) ) then M02 < 0 and the fixed point cannot
be repulsive. That is E∗ >
1
2
(
E − r
γ(1− γ)
)
is a sufficient condition for saddle
point stability.
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Figure 1: Four fixed points: A0 and B0 with Np = 0, A and B with Np > 0.
The parameters’ values are: α = 2, β = 1, γ = 0.4, δ = 0.1, ² = 0.1, η = 0.1,
a = 1, r = 0.1, E = 0.96, N = 1.
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Figure 2: The value of K, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying E. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 3: The value of K, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying η. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 4: The value of E, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying E. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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Figure 5: The value of E, evaluated at the fixed points with Np > 0 and Np = 0
varying η. The dotted lines represent the unreachable fixed points, while the
continuous lines represent the reachable fixed points.
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